|
Larger of Peru's two insurgencies, SL is among the world's most ruthless guerrilla organizations. Formed in the late 1960s by then university professor Abimael Guzman. Stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with peasant revolutionary regime. Also wants to rid Peru of foreign influences. Guzman's capture in September 1992 was a major blow, as were arrests of other SL leaders in 1995, defections, and President Fujimori's amnesty program for repentant terrorists. Activities
Strength
Location/Area of
Operation
The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian outfit that has been alleged to be involved in terrorist violence, mainly targeted against the minority Shia community in Pakistan. The outfit also operates as a political party having fought elections and an activist of the outfit was a minister in the coalition government in Punjab in 1993. The SSP is one of the five outfits that have been proscribed by President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002. The outfit has also opposed Pakistan’s decision to join the US led alliance against the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam Tariq established the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), initially known as the Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba in September 1985 in an environment of increasing sectarian hostility in Pakistani Punjab. The origins of this outfit lie in the feudal set-up of Pakistani Punjab and politico-religious developments in the Seventies and Eighties. Political and economic power in Pakistani Punjab was a privilege of large landowners, mostly Shias, a minority as compared to the Sunni sect. Urban Punjab in contrast, was a non-feudalised middle-class society and largely from the Sunni sect. The SSP is reported to be an offshoot of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a leading politico-religious extremist Sunni Deobandi party. It was also reportedly set up on behest of the then Zia-ul Haq regime as part of the efforts to build an Islamic counter to pro-democracy forces ranged against the military regime of the Eighties. The socio-economic rationale for SSP's origin is explained largely from the economic profile of Jhang, the home base of SSP. Located in a region that divides Central from Southern Pakistani Punjab, Jhang still has a significantly high proportion of large land holdings, leaving feudalism relatively undisturbed. Most large landlords, who are Shias, dominate both society and politics in the region. But, over the years, the area has developed as an important mandi (market town) gradually increasing the power of traders, shopkeepers and transport operators in the region. Seeking a political voice and role, this class, largely from the Sunni community, has been challenging the traditional feudal hold. The most serious political challenge to the control of feudal interests has been articulated in the form of violent sectarianism, with the formation of the SSP. This has meant, however, that the contest for access to resources and status and the competition for domination over the state apparatus are not framed in terms of class divisions, or modernisation imperatives, but confrontationist sectarian identities. As in most areas affected by violence, a major contradiction has risen. While a sizeable proportion of traders and shopkeepers continue to fund the SSP in Jhang, most do not believe in the violence associated with the party, rather it is now a matter of buying security. Nevertheless, there is a decline in their support for the SSP over recent years as a result of the economic consequences of sectarian strife. The SSP wants Pakistan to be declared a Sunni state. Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi, a leading SSP leader said in an interview in January 1998, "the government gives too much importance to the Shias. They are everywhere, on television, radio, in newspapers and in senior positions. This causes heartburn." While fervently believing in hostility towards the Shias, the SSP also aims at restoring the Khilafat system. It also aims to protect the Sunnis and their Shariat (law). The SSP has declared that Shiites are non-Muslims. The SSP came into existence as a reaction to the Iranian Revolution and increasing Shia militancy in Pakistan. There is another school of thought, which says that the SSP phenomenon began from Jhang as a reaction to the socio-economic repression of the masses by Shia feudal structure in the area. Giving his reaction to the warning given to the party by President Pervez Musharraf on August 14, 2001, SSP leader Maulana Mujibur Rehman Inqilabi said that it had nothing to do with terrorism and considered it a danger to the security of the country and people, believing in the negotiated resolution of all issues. He also said that the resolution of the Shia-Sunni issue did not lie in bans, bloodshed, hanging or cruel punishments but in negotiations. Maulana Inqilabi also pointed out that Pervez Musharraf must constitute a tribunal under his supervision comprising the Interior Minister, all provincial Home Secretaries, Chief Justices of the Supreme and High Courts, leading Ulema (religious scholars) and journalists to hear proposals from the Tehreek-e-Jaferia-Pakistan (TJP) and the SSP for the resolution of their differences. He said the tribunal should formulate a code of ethics in the light of the proposals by both the parties, give it a legal cover and then get it followed by all the concerned. Earlier, on January 16, 2001, the SSP and its Shia rival organisation, the Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) reportedly assured the Punjab provincial government of co-operation in the elimination of terrorism from the country. Similarly, on February 3, 2001, the Punjab leadership of the SSP and another Shia outfit, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) announced its willingness to overcome differences and to withdraw cases filed against each other. The SSP also actively opposes the
US-Pakistan alliance formed in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attacks on US targets. The alliance was targeted against the erstwhile
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a major supporter of Sunni extremists and
terrorist outfits in Pakistan. The outfit joined the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI),
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e Pakistan (JUP), Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, and Fazlur Rahman
faction of JuI and Jamaat-e-Ahle Hadith in forming the Afghan Jehad Council
and claiming the US action was not a war against Taliban but against Islam,
and therefore, it was essential for the Muslims to declare Jehad against the
US and its allies. In 1996, protesting against what they termed as the moderating nature of the organisations, the more radical and extremist elements of the SSP walked out of the outfit to form the Lashkar-e Jhangvi, a sectarian terrorist outfit that was proscribed by President Pervez Musharraf on August 14, 2001. In contrast, the SSP has always retained an explicit political profile, contesting elections and having been a constituent of a Punjab coalition government. Despite, SSP denials, the LeJ is widely considered to be the armed wing of the Sipah-e-Sahaba. Many SSP cadres have received arms training from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and the erstwhile Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Militants belonging to the SSP and are also reported to have obtained training from the Pakistani intelligence agencies. The SSP is also reported to be closely linked to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist outfit active in Jammu and Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar, JeM chief, speaking at a Jehad conference in October 2000 said, "now we go hand-in-hand, and Sipah-e-Sahaba stands shoulder to shoulder with Jaish-e-Muhammad in Jehad." The SSP draws support, inspiration and assistance from various political parties in Pakistan, primarily the Jamaat-e-Islam (JeI) and the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (JuI). The JuI is associated with running a large number of madrassas (religious seminaries) all over Pakistan from where recruits for the HuM, SSP and Taliban are provided. The SSP receives significant funding from Saudi Arabia through wealthy private sources in Pakistan. Funds are also acquired from various sources, including Zakat and donations from various Sunni extremist groups. Other sources include donations through local Sunni organisations and trusts, madrassas and study circles, contributions by political groups and funding by underground trade agencies. Most of the foreign funded Sunni madrassas in Pakistan are reportedly controlled by the SSP. The SSP has also been linked to Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, an accused in the New York World Trade Centre bombing of February 1993, who was later captured by the US in February 1995. The SSP is reported to have approximately 3,000 - 6,000 trained activists who indulge in various kinds of violent sectarian activities, which are primarily directed against the Shias. Most SSP cadres hail from Punjab. Towns like Sargodha, Bahawalpur, Jhang, Multan and Muzaffargarh are the SSP strongholds. The dynamic leadership of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi is reported to have popularised an anti-Shia campaign in their backyard, southern and western areas of Punjab. The SSP has influence in all the four
provinces of Pakistan and is considered to be the most powerful extremist
group in the country. It has also succeeded in creating a political vote
bank in the Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The SSP has
reportedly 500 offices and branches in all 34 districts of Punjab. It is
also reported to have approximately 1,00,000 registered workers in Pakistan
and 17 branches in foreign countries including the UAE, Saudi Arabia,
Bangladesh, Canada and England. Maulana Azam Tariq is the current head of the outfit. Allama Ali Sher Ghazni is the Patron-in-Chief of the outfit. Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi serves as the Chairman, Supreme Council. Other important SSP leaders are Qazi Mohammed Ahmed Rashidi, Mohammed Yousuf Mujahid, Tariq Madni, Muhammad Tayyab Qasim and Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi. Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, one of the founder members of SSP was assassinated on February 23, 1990, reportedly by Shia terrorists. He was considered to have been the most prominent SSP leader, belonged to the Deobandi sect and was very popular in Jhang for his speeches. He was originally affiliated with the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam and was a designated leader in Punjab. Maulana Jhangvi aimed to make Pakistan a Sunni state. He contested and lost the election for a national assembly seat in 1990. Haq Nawaz’s avowed mission was to declare Shias as Kafir (infidel) and in this pursuit, he publicly instructed his followers to destroy peace in Pakistan, if it became necessary to get Shias declared as Kafir. Kaka Balli, kin of a former member of the
National Assembly from Jhang, Amanullah Khan Sial, was convicted to lifetime
imprisonment for the assassination of Maulana Jhangvi. After the
assassination, Maulana Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi took over the leadership of the
outfit. He was later killed in a bomb explosion in the Lahore Sessions Court
on January 19, 1997. Maulana Azam Tariq succeeded Maulana Zia-ur Rehman
Farooqi. SSP extremists like other terrorists have two major styles of operation. The first involves targeted killings of prominent opponent organisation activists. In the second, terrorists fire on worshippers in mosques operated by opposing sects. By 1992, the SSP was reported to have gained access to sophisticated arms as also the ability to use these weapons even against law enforcement agencies. In June 1992, its activists used a rocket launcher in an attack which killed five police personnel. In Punjab, 1994 was one of the worst years in terms of sectarian violence when such incidents claimed 73 lives and more than 300 people were injured. Many of these killings were the result of indiscriminate firing on people saying their prayers. The SSP along with several other Sunni and Shia organisations were suspected to have participated in this violence. In 1996, the outfit joined peace efforts initiated by the Milli Yakjeheti Council* though violence continued unabated. The second half of the year was notable for the fact that while the number of incidents decreased, average casualties in these incidents increased. In one such instance where SSP was suspected as the perpetrator, ten persons were killed in indiscriminate firing at a mourning procession in Mailsi in Vehari district in July 1996. News reports have indicated that the SSP and other Sunni outfits hold Iran as the sponsor of Shia extremist outfits in Pakistan. Hence when any major Sunni leader is assassinated, Iranians in Pakistan are targeted for retribution. For instance, the Iranian Counsel General in Lahore, Sadeq Ganji, was killed in December 1990 in what was reported to be a retribution for the February 1990 killing of the SSP co-founder Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Similarly, in January 1997, the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was attacked and set on fire, while in Multan seven persons were killed including the Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi. Earlier, in the month, a bomb blast at the Sessions Court in Lahore left 30 persons dead, including the then SSP chief Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi along with 22 policemen and a journalist. News reports said that the retribution continued in September 1997 when five personnel of the Iranian armed forces who were in Pakistan for training were killed by suspected Sunni terrorists. As with other sectarian outfits in Pakistan, the SSP has chosen to lie low after the military coup of November 1999. This lends credence to the hypothesis that SSP like other sectarian and ethnic groups, indulge in violence only when a passive state guarantees an environment of neutrality and even tacit support to this violence. With a hard-line stance being taken by the military regime against internal violence within Pakistan, these organisations have chosen to keep a low profile. Besides, terrorist acts, the SSP also organises agitational programmes. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Chairman Maulana Azam Tariq said in Sahiwal, on August 20, 2001, that the outfit would launch a ‘court arrest’ movement if the government failed to release all the detained SSP workers by August 31, 2001. According to him, 10 SSP activists would court arrest in the four provincial capitals daily until all the activists are released. The activists were arrested as part of the campaign to check sectarian outfits. The SSP also observed a countrywide protest on August 24, 2001, against police raids on SSP and terrorist outfits’ offices, arrests of religious activists and desecration of mosques and religious institutions. Earlier, on August 7, 2001, SSP Karachi Vice-President, Maulana Muhammad Ameen accused police of registering false cases of terrorism against its cadres. He observed that the police were resorting to extra-judicial attempts in order to force confessional statements from arrested SSP cadre. As part of its opposition to the
US-Pakistan alliance against the erstwhile Taliban regime, the SSP joined
other members of the Afghan Jehad Council on September 20, 2001 in
announcing a Jehad against the US forces if they used Pakistani soil to
carry out military attacks on the Taliban regime. The SSP leadership while
criticising the Pakistani government’s decision of extending support to the
US-led air attacks on the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan also
indicated that they would fight alongside the Taliban militia. Activities and Incidents 2001 December 30 – Five SSP cadres arrested during raids by law enforcing authorities on the outfit’s Karachi office. December 4 – SSP Karachi’s Finance Secretary, Engineer Ilyas Zubair, voluntarily surrendered before the Chief of Crime Investigations Agency (CIA), who later detained him under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO). October 28 – A police personnel and 17 members of the Christian community including five children were killed and nine others injured when six unidentified gunmen opened indiscriminate fire on a church in Model Town, Bahawalpur. The SSP is suspected to be responsible for the massacre. October 19 – Pakistan authorities, in response to anti-US protests, barred SSP chief Azam Tariq from entering Sindh province where major rallies and protest demonstrations against US air strikes in Afghanistan were taking place. The ban was applicable for 30 days. October 16 –SSP leader Maulana Fazl-i-Ahad said in Peshawar that the outfit had decided to send its cadres for waging Jehad against the US. He indicated that a group of 80 SSP cadres were ready to leave for Afghanistan. October 15 – An SSP leader, Maulana Allah Wasaya Siddiqi, said that US air strikes on the erstwhile Taliban regime in Afghanistan "proved that America was the biggest terrorist of the world." October 12 –SSP’s Senior Vice-President Khalifa Abdul Qayyum speaking in Dera Ismail Khan said that the US government had "proved itself to be a terrorist state." Commenting on the air strikes against the erstwhile Taliban regime in Afghanistan, he claimed that Osama bin Laden was only being used as an excuse and the US was attempting to establish camps in the region. October 11 –At a protest rally in Peshawar, SSP provincial chief Maulana Fazal Ahad said that the US should withdraw from Afghanistan, failing which it would "taste fatal upset just like former Soviet Union during Afghan Jihad." He also asked the cadres to enlist their names with the SSP high command for waging Jehad against ‘infidel forces’ and reiterated that the outfit would fight with the Taliban side by side after getting an approval from SSP central chief Azam Tariq. October 9 – SSP leader Syed Paryal Shah said in Khairpur, that US action in Afghanistan was not a war against Taliban but against Islam, and therefore, it was essential for the Muslims to declare Jehad against the US and its allies. September 29 – A news report said that 38 SSP activists were arrested during the preceding nine months in Dera Ismail Khan. September 16 – The SSP at a meeting in Peshawar, said Muslims of Pakistan would not tolerate any assistance by the Federal government to the USA in its possible attacks on the erstwhile Taliban regime. While declaring the US as the ‘biggest criminal in the world’, SSP leaders alleged that the terrorist acts in New York and Washington DC were a conspiracy to defame Islam. September 15 – SSP Sindh chapter Vice President Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem arrested from Karachi in connection with two cases in which five persons, including four brothers, were killed in 1995. August 14 – LeJ proscribed by President Pervez Musharraf July 1 – Two unidentified gunmen at the Basti Tareenabad in Dera Ismail Khan killed a SSP activist. June 23 – Two police personnel and an activist of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) were injured in Gilgit following an exchange of fire between security forces and activists of the SSP and the Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat. May 21 – Various Sunni sectarian outfits alleged that the country’s intelligence agencies were responsible for the killing of Maulana Saleem Qadri, the Sunni Tehreek chief on May 18, 2001. According to these outfits, the agencies were utilising the SSP to trigger sectarian violence among the Shia, Sunni, Deoband and Barelwi sects. May 21 – Four persons were killed in separate incidents of sectarian clashes in Dera Ismail Khan. In the first incident, an activist of the SSP, who was released from the local prison a few days earlier, was killed. Official sources indicated the involvement of Shia groups in the incident. Sources also said that the violence erupted consequent to the arrest of a Shia leader, Syed Hassan Ali Shah Kazmi, on a charge of allegedly delivering anti-state speeches. In apparent retaliation, certain SSP activists killed a Shia youth and injured two others. Police sources added that two more persons were killed in the clashes on the same day. April 30 – A Karachi Anti-terrorism Court holds two SSP activists guilty of killing a police personnel and his son on February 22, 2001 and sentences them to death. April 3 – Eight SSP activists arrested from Korangi in Karachi following clashes between two sectarian outfits. April – An anti-terrorism court sentenced two SSP activists to death for killing a former Deputy Superintendent of Police and his young son on February 22, 2001. March 12 – Nine persons including the a local SSP chief were killed and 11 others injured as three unidentified terrorists opened indiscriminate fire on a congregation at the Hayat-e-Islam mosque in Lahore. According to official sources, the attack was carried out in the most sensitive locality of Lahore where agencies like Garrison Security Force, Military Police and others are located. Sources also said that the attack was carried out despite tight security measures adopted in view of the presence of Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf in the city. The mosque is administered by the SSP. Official sources indicated that the attack could be in retaliation for the March 4 sectarian violence at Sheikhupura. An SSP spokesperson, Qazi Bahaur Rehman, alleged that the TJP was responsible for the massacre. March 4 – 13 persons, including two police personnel, were killed and four others injured in a series of four attacks by a group of six terrorists in Sheikhpura Four of the terrorists were arrested. Official sources said that the killings are alleged to be an outcome of SSP activist Haq Nawaz Jhangvi’s execution. SSP Sheikhpura chief, Zahid Mahmood Qasmi however, denied the outfit’s involvement in the attacks. March 2 – Two SSP activists arrested from the Orangi Extension area in Karachi for their alleged involvement in the killing of a TJP activist. March 1 – 13 persons were killed in sectarian violence at Hangu in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Official sources maintained that this followed an incident in which an unidentified person opened indiscriminate fire killing three persons and injuring another. Other sources however held that the killings were an aftermath of the execution of SSP activist Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. February 28 –SSP activist Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was executed in Mianwali Jail, Lahore after being held guilty for the December 1990 assassination of the Iranian Consul General, Agha Sadiq Ganji. Police had arrested hundreds of SSP activists for fear of violent protests after Jhangvi's execution and possible clashes between rival sectarian groups from the majority Sunni and the minority Shi'ite sects. However, one person was killed and six others injured in an encounter between the protesting SSP activists and police at Mohallah Piplianwala in Jhang on the same day of the execution. Later at the funeral of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, SSP leader Sheikh Hakim Ali, while warning of countrywide protests, said, "The government is responsible for killing our brother. It is done to please Iran." February 22 – A former Deputy Superintendent of Police and his son killed. Later in April 2001 an anti-terrorism court sentenced two SSP activists to death for the killings. February 15 – , SSP General-Secretary Abdur Rauf Baloch arrested in the Gomal area of Dera Ismail Khan for his alleged involvement in the killing of five persons in Fateh village, on April 26, 1999. 2000 November 18 – A Karachi anti-terrorism court sentenced an SSP activist to a seven-year term for possessing illegal arms and creating terror. November 5 – Two SSP activists were killed and another injured when unidentified terrorists fired at them in Mirpurkhas. The SSP blamed the TJP for the killing. October 22 – Two SSP activists killed and eight others injured when two unidentified persons attacked their van in Karachi. The next day, two activists of the TJP were arrested for their suspected involvement in the killings. Previous incidents 1994 – 73 persons killed and more than 300 injured in Punjab’s worst year of violence. The SSP along with several other Sunni and Shia organisations were suspected to have participated in this violence. June 1992 – SSP activists for the first time, use a rocket launcher in an attack which killed five police personnel. December 1990 – Iran's Counsel General in Lahore, Sadeq Ganji killed. February 1990 –SSP co-founder and chief, Maulana Jhangvi killed 1988 – A leader of the Shia outfit, Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ) Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini killed. 1987 – Prominent Sunni leader Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman Yazdani assassinated. 1986 – Prominent leader of the Sunni Ahl-e-Hadith, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer assassinated.
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru A Peruvian Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1984 by organizations from the radical left, including the MTA and MIR-IV. Its objective is to rid Peru of imperialism and establish a Marxist regime. During the 1990s, has suffered from defections and government counter-terrorist successes in addition to infighting and loss of leftist support . Tupac Amaru, which is estimated to have
between 300 and 600 members, operates mainly in the upper Huallaga Valley, a
vast jungle area in eastern Peru controlled by guerrillas and drug
traffickers. On April 22, 1997, the Peruvian special forces launched a raid on the embassy compound, liberated the remaining 72 hostages and killed all the 14 MRTA militants, including the group's leader, Nestor Cerpa. 1984: The MRTA is founded by organizations from the radical-left, including the MTA and the MIR-IV . In 1986/87, the MRTA begins its armed struggle against the government of Alan Garcia. Its actions were concentrated in the regions of San Martin, Loreto, and Uyacali in the northern Amazon region. February 1987: The MRTA occupies seven radio stations in Lima and reads a communique against the increasing militarization of the society . July 1988: An MRTA commando kidnaps retired air force general and businessman Garcia . February 1989: Police arrest MRTA leader Victor Polay and imprison him in Canto Grande prison in Lima . End of the 1980s: The MRTA becomes increasingly active in rural areas. January 9, 1990: An MRTA commando shoots former Defense Minister E. Lopez Albujar. July 1990: Victor Polay and 46 other inmates escape from Canto Grande prison via a 315 meter long tunnel . June 10, 1992: Victor Polay is arrested again. November 30, 1995: 30 Tupac Amaristas are arrested after a plot to occupy the Peruvian Congress, holding its members hostage in exchange for jailed MRTA militants, was foiled. December 17, 1996: An MRTA commando occupies the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima and takes all the guests at a reception in honor of Japan's Emperor hostage. Most of the hostages were released but the commando continued to hold 72 people prisoner, including the brother of President Alberto Fujimori, several generals and heads of police divisions, Peru's Foreign Minister, Supreme Court judges, Members of Congress from the ruling party, and the ambassadors of Japan and Bolivia. April 22, 1997: A raid is launched on the embassy compound by Peruvian special forces. All 14 members of the MRTA's "Commando Edgar Sanchez", including the group's leader Nestor Cerpa, are killed. MRTA was named for an 18th-century rebel leader who fought Spanish colonial, Tupac Amaru, because he symbolizes the Peruvian people's struggle against their oppressors. Tupac Amaru was drawn and quartered in the square in Cuzco after leading an anti-Spanish rebellion which almost shook off Spain's domination of a large part of South America. The goal of the MRTA is to replace the representative democracy with the "power of the people". The organization has three levels: the revolutionary forces, which consist of full-time soldiers; when needed, these forces are backed up by part-time militias; then there is the base, in the villages, where there are self-defense committees whose duties extend well beyond military matters into social, political, and legal fields as well.
MRTA does not establish "liberated zones" in the classic sense of the term, rather it supports, with military means, the creation of "organized bases of popular power".
MRTA launched its armed struggle in San Martin province, where the conditions were most favorable. In the countryside, the farmers were organized, as the region was the most stable base of the CCP (Confederacion Campesina del Peru) in all of Peru. In 1985/86, MRTA began to build up its forces, and in 1987 launched its first actions.
During the campaigns Che Vive and Tupac Amaru Libertador, it temporarily occupied a few provincial cities, attacked police stations, and carried out public meetings. In 1987, MRTA was able, for the first time, to take over a provincial capital, Juanji, a city of 25,000 inhabitants. That same year it occupied the Sisa Valley for two weeks.
According to Victor Polay, MRTA's leader at the beginning of the 1990s, Peru is no longer semi-feudal, rather it has become a dependent capitalist country. There is a bourgeoisie which represents the interests of imperialism. The working class has grown enormously, so the MRTA needs anti-capitalist elements in its political theory.
According to MRTA's theory, in every factory and in every school there must be mechanisms of direct control by the people. The monopolies must be transformed into property of the people but not state controlled because public corporations are dependent on the government, and are therefore subject to bureaucratization and corruption. The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe affected the MRTA because it revealed the bureaucratization of the society and the privileged role of one party, and the USSR's domination of COMECON, which led to the distortion of many structures. According to Polay the revolution cannot be exported, it must be created everywhere by the people where they live.
Another of MRTA's leaders, known as Comandante Andres, thinks that in Peru there's a pre-revolutionary condition with some of the traits of a revolutionary situation. According to Andres the defeat of the regime, of the "imperial" social and economic system, and the building of a new model through revolution, through armed struggle, is possible.
However, it isn't the MRTA that's going to make a revolution in Peru, but the Peruvian people, through their numerous social and political organizations, within which the MRTA has an important role. MRTA isn't the vanguard, the only vanguard, but part of the social vanguard.
MRTA sees Sendero Luminoso as dogmatic and Stalinist. Their lack of theory is coupled with a dictatorial, terrorist-militarist praxis, which in many cases is directed at the people itself. Sendero represents the more marginalized sectors of the society.
There's more that separates MRTA from than unites it with Sendero Luminoso. Sendero believes that its leaders' ideas express a qualitative development, a fourth stage of Marxism-Leninism. MRTA leaders have conceptual and concrete differences in the practice of revolutionary struggle.
Sendero is characterized by its negative image. They don't seek to win hearts and minds, but impose their direction on the people, which is why they don't hesitate to kill to achieve their dominion. Sendero is also characterized by its cruelty, which is strongly repudiated.
Their Pol Pot concept of life and revolution is a long way from what MRTA leaders think of as revolution. But at the same time, Sendero achieved a certain strength because of certain actions it took. In 1980, Sendero began the armed struggle at a time when other organizations were saying it wasn't possible. Later, through its actions, it showed its true character and that objectively limited its growth. MRTA `s aim is to approach and become involved closely with the people. Aside from the political work done by the organizations at various opportunities - it uses armed propaganda, mainly in the cities.
MRTA hopes to build socialism because capitalism has not been, nor has the possibility of being, according to them, the solution to the Peruvian people's problems, not a socialism styled and modeled after the eastern European countries, a model which failed in practice, but a socialism appropriate to conditions in Peru.
MRTA leaders don't want state centralism or the bureaucratization of Pesociety but a democratic, very participatory society; not an electoral democracy every five years, but a democracy where men and women get involved in their workplace, their community, their neighborhood and decide their own destiny, a "participatory democracy with the people as the actors".
Victor Polay is a jurist, fluent in both French and Basque. He studied in both France and Spain - together with Alan Garcia (who later became President of Peru), with whom he lived for a short time.
After 1987, Polay, now known as Comandante Rolando, carried out a series of guerrilla actions in San Martin, until he was arrested during a raid on a tourist hotel in Huancayo.
In July 1990 Polay and 46 other MRTA militants staged a spectacular escape from Canto Grande Prison. Polay was re-arrested in 1992 and is detained in total isolation in the Callao navy base.
Nestor Cerpa Cartolini the leader of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, known by the nom de guerre Comandante Evaristo, took the helm of the Tupac Amaru organization after its founder, Victor Polay, was captured in June 1992. Cerpa was a founding member of the group and its military commander.
Unlike other leaders of Tupac Amaru, who come from the middle class, Cerpa was from a working-class family and was active in the labor movement of the 1970s. As a young union official nearly 20 years ago, Cerpa and his fellow workers took control of a bankrupt textile factory after its owners tried to close it down. Four people died in the conflict, and Cerpa served a year in prison.
After his release, he joined the leftist movement and later went underground. Cerpa has displayed an uncanny ability to elude capture.
Cerpa was the leader of the commando who took hostages the guests at the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima in December 1996 and died during the attack on the embassy compound on 22 April 1997.
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC) The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia is an umbrella organization intended to consolidate the major local and regional paramilitary groups fighting against Colombia’s Marxist guerillas. The AUC claims to
protect its sponsors—mainly economic elites and drug traffickers—from
left-wing guerilla groups. However, far from being merely a defensive
organization, the AUC is notorious for attacking perceived supporters of the
insurgents, often wiping out whole villages. It has also displaced large
sectors of the local population in order to gain control over drug-producing
areas. The militias that would eventually unite under the banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia began as local vigilante groups formed to protect wealthy land-owners and drug traffickers, frequent targets of kidnappers, from left-wing insurgents. By far the most notorious of these vigilante groups was Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) or “Death to Kidnappers,” formed in the early 1980’s by drug lord Pablo Escobar, and several other local leaders of the drug trade. The burgeoning drug trade gave the paramilitaries unprecedented influence and political clout. Colombian authorities began to view the paramilitaries as a counterweight to the increasingly effective armies of the FARC and the ELN—a force capable of fighting the guerillas in ways the Colombian Armed Forces could not. Throughout the 1980’s, the paramilitaries continued to receive arms and training from the Colombian military. In 1989, as abuses and atrocities committed by the paramilitaries mounted, the Colombian government was forced to outlaw the paramilitaries and vigilante groups. However, no significant effort was made to disband the militias, and regional groups continued to receive unofficial aid, mostly from local military commanders. According to a report entitled “The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links,” by Human Rights Watch: As recently as 1999, Colombian government investigators gathered compelling evidence that Army officers set up a “paramilitary” group using active duty, retired, and reserve duty military officers along with hired paramilitaries who effectively operated alongside Army soldiers and in collaboration with them. In the early 1990’s the United Self-Defense Forces of Crdoba and Urab, headed by brothers Carlos and Fidel Castao, emerged as the predominant militia group in northwestern Colombia. The ACCU formed the nucleus of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), formed in 1997 under the leadership of Carlos Castano (Fidel is now presumed dead). Current member groups of the AUC include Peasant Self-Defense Group of Cordoba and Urab (ACCU), Eastern Plains Self-Defense Group, Cesar Self-Defense Group, Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group, Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group, Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group, Pacific Bloc (including the “Frente Calima” in and around Cali), Southern Bloc, and “Frente Capital” forming in Bogota.
The AUC quickly became the main counter to the
FARC rebels in northern Colombia, and has used brutal methods to crowd
perceived supporters out of the lucrative coca-growing areas in other parts
of Colombia as well. Most sources estimate the AUC has between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters, although Carlos Castano claims to have up to 11,000. According to the Center for Defense Information, the AUC’s membership has tripled in the last three years, mainly due to its deepening involvement in the drug trade. The AUC is reportedly growing about five times as fast as the FARC.
AUC forces are strongest in the northwest in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar Departments. Since 1999, the group demonstrated a growing presence in other northern and southwestern departments.
Resources and Financing The AUC is well-funded and armed, and reportedly pays its members a monthly salary. According to AUC political leader Carlos Castano some 70 percent of the AUC’s operational costs are financed by drug-related earnings, the rest from “donations” from its sponsors. In a 1999 interview with the Colombian magazine Cambio, Castano said: “We finance ourselves with what the coca growers produce, I charge them a 60 percent tax on what they earn.”
The “donations” received from landowners and drug lords are a form of “protection money” paid out to the paramilitaries in return for defense against the FARC and ELN. In testifying to a congressional subcommittee in March 2001, DEA Administrator Donnie Marshall noted that the AUC has become increasingly involved in all levels of the drug trade. Carlos Casta?o “has recently admitted in open press that his group receives payments - similar to the taxes levied by the FARC - from coca growers in southern Colombia in exchange for protection from guerrillas. Several paramilitary groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Casta?o organization, and possibly other paramilitary groups, appears to be directly involved in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia. Carlos Castano has repeatedly petitioned the Colombian government for political status for the AUC, which, in contrast to the various guerilla groups has so far not been recognized by the government as a political organization. In his campaign to have the AUC represented in on-going peace talks between the government and the leftist rebels, Castano resigned from the leadership of the AUC on 6 June 2001, saying that he would henceforth devote his energies to the “political directorate” of the AUC. Castano was replaced—at least nominally—by a nine-member Central Command. The Central Command includes: Ram?n Isaza, Adolfo Paz, Botal?n, Mart?n Llano, Rodrigo Molano, Alejandro, Antonio Cauca, Santander Lozada and Juli?n Bol?var. What effect Castano’s resignation will have in reality is not known, and he is still acknowledged as the overall commander of the AUC. The AUC is believed to be responsible for most of the atrocities committed in Colombia, in particular against the country’s civilian population. According to the Center for International Policy in Washington, “The paramilitaries are responsible for about 75 percent of all politically motivated killings and the vast majority of forced displacements in Colombia.” It’s targets include supporters or perceived supporters of left-wing groups, as well as political activists, police officials and judges. According to human rights sources, in 2001 alone, the AUC killed more than one thousand civilians (for comparison, the largest Marxist guerilla group, the FARC, killed 197 civilians.). The AUC is notorious for carrying out wholesale massacres of remote villages, with the intention of frightening residents into leaving their homes and farms. By displacing large portions of the peasant population the AUC gains control over major coca-growing territories. The U.S. State Department noted that the AUC was responsible for about 43 percent of Colombia’s internally displaced people in 2001.
|