LATEST: Scotland Yard Anti-Terrorist Operation

17 August 2004:

Eight men arrested in anti-terror raids have been charged with conspiring to commit murder and launch radioactive or chemical attacks.

One of them has also been charged with having plans which could have been used as the basis for a terror attack on the New York Stock Exchange, the International Monetary Fund in Washington and the Citigroup financial services firm in New York.

The men were among 13 arrested on August 3 in a series of raids by the Anti-Terrorist Branch and MI5 in London, Bushey in Hertfordshire, Luton in Bedfordshire, and Blackburn in Lancashire.

They were charged at the high-security Paddington Green police station in London.

The eight men are Dhiren Barot, 32, of Willesden, London; Omar Abdur Rehman, 20, of Bushey, Hertfordshire; Mohammed Ul Haq, 25, of Paddington, London; Abdul Aziz Jalil, 31, of Luton, Bedfordshire; Nadeem Tarmohamed, 26, of Willesden, London; Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, 24, of Harrow, Middlesex; Quaisar Shaffi, 25, of Willesden, London, and Junade Feroze, of Blackburn, Lancashire.

They are all charged with conspiring to murder "other persons" between January 2000 and August 4 this year.

A second charge alleges that between the same dates they plotted to use "radioactive materials, toxic gases, chemicals and explosives".

Both charges were made under the Criminal Law Act 1977.

Barot and Tarmohammed were also charged under the Terrorism Act in connection with an alleged plot to target financial institutions in the United States.

They are alleged to have been in possession of a "reconnaissance plan" of the Prudential Building in New Jersey which, according to the charge, was "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism".

Barot was further charged with having "reconnaissance plans" for the Stock Exchange and Citigroup in New York and the IMF in Washington.

Shaffi was also charged under the Terrorism Act with possessing an extract from the Terrorist's Handbook which contained information on preparing chemicals and explosives.

All eight will appear in custody at Bow Street Magistrates' Court, sitting at Belmarsh prison, tomorrow.

A ninth man, Matthew Philip Monks, 32, of Sudbury, London, who was questioned with them at Paddington Green was charged with possessing a banned weapon.

18 August 2004:

LATEST: Scotland Yard Anti-Terrorist Operation

Eight men who were arrested by Anti-Terrorist Branch officers at locations in Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Lancashire and London on 3/8/04 and who have been held at a Central London police station, are being charged as follows.

CHARGE 1 - CONSPIRACY TO MURDER

Dhiren BAROT, Mohammed Naveed BHATTI, Abdul Aziz JALIL, Omar Abdul REHMAN, Junade FEROZE, Zia UL HAQ, Qaisar SHAFFI and Nadeem TARMOHAMMED on diverse days between the 1st day of January 2000 and the 4th day of August 2004 conspired together and with other persons unknown to murder other persons contrary to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

CHARGE 2 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT PUBLIC NUISANCE

Dhiren BAROT, Mohammed Naveed BHATTI, Abdul Aziz JALIL, Omar Abdul REHMAN, Junade FEROZE, Zia UL HAQ, Qaisar SHAFFI and Nadeem TARMOHAMMED on diverse days between the 1st day of January 2000 and the 4th day of August 2004 conspired together and with other persons unknown to commit public nuisance by the use of radioactive materials, toxic gases, chemicals and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury contrary to Section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

CHARGE 3 - POSSESSING A DOCUMENT OR RECORD OF INFORMATION OF A KIND LIKELY TO BE USEFUL TO A PERSON COMMITTING OR PREPARING AN ACT OF TERRORISM

Dhiren BAROT and Nadeem TARMOHAMMED on a day or days between 19th day of February 2001 and 4th day of August 2004 had in their possession a documents or record, namely a reconnaissance plan concerning the Prudential Building in New Jersey, containing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism contrary to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

CHARGE 4 - POSSESSING A DOCUMENT OR RECORD OF INFORMATION OF A KIND LIKELY TO BE USEFUL TO A PERSON COMMITTING OR PREPARING AN ACT OF TERRORISM

Dhiren BAROT on a day or days between 19th day of February 2001 and 4th day of August 2004 had in his possession documents or records, namely a reconnaissance plan concerning the Stock Exchange in New York, a reconnaissance plan concerning the IMF in Washington DC, a reconnaissance plan concerning Citigroup in New York and two notebooks containing information on explosives, poisons, chemicals and related matters containing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism contrary to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

CHARGE 5- POSSESSING A DOCUMENT OR RECORD OF INFORMATION OF A KIND LIKELY TO BE USEFUL TO A PERSON COMMITTING OR PREPARING AN ACT OF TERRORISM

Qaisar SHAFFI on a day or days between 19th day of February 2001 and 4th day of August 2004 had in his possession documents or records, namely an extract of the Terrorist's Handbook containing information on the preparation of chemicals, explosive recipes and other information about explosives, containing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism contrary to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Further details of those charged above as follows: 

A - Dhiren BAROT (19/12/71 - aged 32) of Willesden, London.

B - Omar Abdur REHMAN (17/12/83 - aged 20) of Bushey, Hertfordshire.

E - Mohammed Ul HAQ (7/10/78 - aged 25) of Paddington, London.

F - Abdul Aziz JALIL (22/4/73 - aged 31) of Luton, Bedfordshire.

H - Nadeem TARMOHAMED (19/5/78 - aged 26) of Willesden, London.

I - Mohammed Naveed BHATTI (16/1/80 - aged 24) of Harrow, Middlesex.

J - Quaisar SHAFFI (30/8/78 - aged 25) of Willesden, London.

L - Junade FEROZE (18/8/75 - aged 28) of Blackburn, Lancashire.

All eight appeared in custody at Bow Street Magistrates‚ Court, sitting at Belmarsh, on Wed. 18 August 04.

A ninth man [D] - Matthew Philip MONKS (3/10/71 - aged 32) of Sudbury, London - is being charged with possession of a prohibited weapon.

17 August 2004:

Testimony of Acting Director of Central Intelligence

John E. McLaughlin

before the Senate Armed Services Committee on

9-11 Commission Findings

Mr. Chairman, as this Committee considers reorganization proposals by the President, the Kean Commission and the Congress, I want to speak to the structure and capabilities of the Intelligence Community as it is today, not as it was in 2001. I believe that today's Intelligence Community provides a much stronger foundation than many people realize for whatever changes you decide to make. That said, we can still do better, and I will close with some thoughts on how this can be accomplished.

Intelligence Community Today

Three years of war have profoundly affected the Intelligence Community. Since 9/11, our capacity and effectiveness have grown as our resources have increased and as we have taken steps to address many of the issues others have highlighted. This has been the most dramatic period of change in my memory. Some examples:

*     Our policies—the Nation's and the Intelligence Community's—have changed—we are on the offensive against terrorists worldwide and many of the most dangerous are captured or dead.

*     Our practices have changed—intelligence, law enforcement and military officers serve together and share information real time on the front lines at home and abroad. And in Washington, I chair an operational meeting every day with Intelligence community and law enforcement elements represented. Decisions made there go immediately to officers in the field whose penetration and disruption of terrorist groups yields the kind of increasingly precise intelligence you have seen in the last two weeks.

*     Our worldwide coalition has changed—it is broader, deeper, and more committed. Where terrorists found sanctuary before, they find our allies now—and we are seeing the results from Manama to Mexico City.

*     Our laws have changed—the Patriot Act has given us weapons in the war we did not have and we have saved lives because of them.

*     Our institutions have changed—The Terrorist Threat Integration Center enables us to share intelligence collected abroad with law enforcement information collected at home—and plots have been stopped in the US because of that. Twenty-six different data networks now flow there to be shared by officers from the widest array of foreign and domestic intelligence agencies ever assembled in one organization. People who think we can't break down the so-called "stovepipes" need to visit TTIC.

In turn, the changes affected our ability to wage war and the impact of change has been striking.

*     It was imaginative covert action—CIA officers working with the US military—that helped drive military operations and ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and broke up the al Qaida sanctuary.

*     Terrorist arrests are increasing steadily. That evidence comes with your morning newspapers nearly every day now.

*     CIA, FBI, Treasury, and other partners, at home and abroad are starving the al Qa'ida of its lifeblood—-money.

*     CIA has worked with the FBI, as it has taken down extremists in Lackawanna, Columbus, and New York City.

*     Our coalition partners include, by varying degrees, Libyans and Russians, Chinese and Hungarians, Pakistanis and Saudis—and our traditional allies in Europe and Asia.

In short, the situation has changed dramatically from where the 9/11 Commission left off. Two things, however, are still true: al Qaida and other terrorists remain dangerous and there is still room for improvement in the Intelligence Community. But the image that many seek to perpetuate of a Community that does not share information or work together, a Community of turf-conscious people competing for influence—that is not the Community I lead. It is a caricature that does a great disservice to the men and women who put it on the line every day, 24/7.

Supporting the Warfighter

Because of this Committee's special responsibilities, I need to say a word about the Intelligence Community's support to the warfighter. And as we discuss various proposals for restructuring the Intelligence Community today, let me be clear about one thing: no matter what course the Administration and Congress choose, intelligence support to the military, especially in time of war, should not be allowed to diminish—and I believe such support can and will be preserved under any of the options being considered. Everyone in the Intelligence Community understands that NSA, NGA, and NRO, all vital parts of the National Intelligence Community, are also combat support agencies. Let me give you the assurance that the relationship between the Intelligence Community and the uniformed military has never been closer. Some data points:

*     The Secretary of Defense has met frequently with George Tenet and myself to coordinate policies across the board.

*     A Navy Seal Three Star—Admiral Calland—sits right across the hall from me with the mission of ensuring we and the military are connected and that both sides are getting what they need.

*     CIA and US military officers have been living and fighting together for three years in the mountains and plains of Afghanistan where they have al-Qa'ida on the run.

*     Our collection, operational, and analytic support to military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is close and continuous.

*     The CIA deployed 12 Crisis Operations Liaison Teams to CENTCOM specifically tailored to work side-by-side with Special Operations and conventional forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

*     I hold frequent video conferences with CENTCOM Commander Abizaid to personally assure that we understand his perspective and needs.

*     We have upgraded information technology support to the military in the field, so that Intelligence Community products are now available in 80 military intelligence centers around the globe.

Thoughts on Reform

Looking ahead now, it is important to note that the threat from terrorist organizations is not stagnant. These organizations learn and adapt. It is not enough for us to keep up, we must anticipate and keep ahead. As we seek to build on the improvements we've made in recent years, we should keep in mind a few of what I would call "first principles":

First, speed and agility are the keys to the war on terrorism, and profoundly important to the nation's other intelligence challenges. Speed and agility are not promoted by complicated wiring diagrams, more levels of bureaucracy, increased dual hatting, or inherent questions about who is in charge.

Second, as in architecture, form should follow function. The functions intelligence must perform today are dramatically different than during the Cold War. Back then, we focused heavily on large strategic forces and where countries stood in the bipolar competition of the day. Today, the focus is more on locating people, tracking shipments of dangerous materials, understanding politics down to the tribal level in a world where the only constant is change.

Third, in this world clear structure and clear chain of command is better than its opposite.

Fourth, most important to knowing how and what to change is consensus on what we want from our intelligence agencies, constancy in resource and moral support for them through good and bad times, and patience. The Commission says that the country cannot be patient. But to quote a saying I learned during my Army years: if you want it bad; you will get it bad.

Drawing on these principles, I believe that short, clear lines of command and control are required in whatever structure you establish, regardless of what you call its leader. Three words are key: agility, flexibility, and speed. You need to build these into any new structures and procedures.

No matter how successfully we anticipate future challenges, we will not foresee them all. So, we will need the ability to adapt our organizations to change, easily and quickly. We will need flexibility in shifting resources, people and money to respond to shifting priorities. The DCI can do some of this with existing authorities. But frankly, it is too complicated and ponderous. It involves more negotiation and signoffs than the times will allow.

That is why, should the President's proposal to create a National Intelligence Director be adopted, I believe that individual should have the clear authority to move people and resources and to evaluate the performance of the national intelligence agencies and their leaders. And this should be accomplished in the cleanest and most direct manner you can devise.

People often remark that DCIs allow too much in the Intelligence Community to be "CIA-centric"—whether it is the staffing of centers or the preparation of National Estimates. Well, the reason is simple. It's because the DCI "can"—that is these are the troops he directly commands and can task and move with little effort or resistance. If the DCI had enhanced authorities along the lines I've suggested or if you create a NID like that, you should expect to see much more integration of effort in the Community and a greater capacity to create cross-Community task forces and centers in a more agile and seamless way.

You would also see more progress by a DCI or NID on things like common policies for personnel, training, security, and information technology.

As you consider all of this, here is a key thing to think about: who will you hold responsible not just when things are going well but when something goes wrong with intelligence? Today, it is the DCI even though his authorities over the rest of the Community outside CIA are limited. If in the future it will be a National Intelligence Director, what authorities would be commensurate with that kind of responsibility? And what would that person actually be responsible for? What the Community concludes substantively about major issues, like Iraq, North Korea, or terrorism? If the answer is yes, that person will need direct access to sizeable numbers of collectors and analysts, just as the DCI has today. The question then arises about where those people will come from and with what impact.

Or would the NID be responsible less for substantive matters and principally for the "management" and integration of resources—and can the two be separated? If they can, will responsibility and accountability be harder to pin down than it is today—especially in view of the fact that the person you now hold responsible—the head of CIA—would then be at least a layer away from the top?

I regret to close with a series of questions, but I believe they illustrate the complexity of these issues and the need to proceed cautiously and with care as we contemplate changes to an Intelligence system on which the nation must depend, more than ever, for its security.

11 August 2004:

NEW UK TERROR POLICY

Future government policy on the internment without trial of foreign nationals suspected of terrorist links will be decided when the Court of Appeal delivers its judgement on a challenge by 10 detainees.

Lawyers for the men - most of whom are held at Belmarsh prison in London - have challenged a ruling of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) that Home Secretary David Blunkett had "sound material" to back up his decision that they were a risk to national security.

The men are backed by civil liberties groups, which describe their treatment as "Britain's Guantanamo Bay".

Ben Emmerson QC, for eight of the detainees, argued at a hearing last month that the SIAC was wrong in holding that it was entitled to consider evidence which might have been obtained under torture or ill-treatment at Guantanamo Bay, Bagram airbase in Afghanistan or other US detention centres.

Mr Emmerson said that the use of evidence gathered by torture, even if true, was "morally repugnant" in a democratic society and "an affront to the public conscience".

The appeals, heard by Lords Justices Pill, Laws and Neuberger, stem from the terms of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, rushed through in 2001 after the September 11 terrorist atrocities in New York and Washington.

Under the emergency powers the Government must show only that it has "reasonable grounds to suspect" that foreign nationals have links to terror before issuing certificates to hold them.

The court heard that two of the eight appellants represented by Mr Emmerson had now exercised their option to leave the UK rather than remain in detention.

One was a Moroccan national who returned home in December 2001, and the other, a French national as well as Algerian, went to France in March 2002.

None of the appellants was certified as being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism. They were certified as being members of, or belonging to, or supporting or assisting, an international terrorist group.

11 August 2004:

NEW HEAD OF CIA NOMINATED

President George Bush has nominated a former undercover agent to head the embattled Central Intelligence Agency.

He said Republican congressman Porter Goss "knows the CIA inside and out" and can bolster its spy network.

"He is well prepared for this mission," the president said of Goss, chairman of the House intelligence committee who was an Army intelligence operative before joining the CIA in the 1960s.

"He's the right man to lead and support the agency at this critical moment in our nation's history," said the president in the White House Rose Garden.

Goss, whose nomination must be confirmed by the Senate, had been mentioned prominently in speculation about a successor to departed CIA Director George Tenet, who left amid a torrent of criticism of the agency's handling of pre-war intelligence on Iraq.

Bush still has a major decision ahead of him. He has embraced a cornerstone recommendation by the commission investigating the September 11 terror attacks: creation of a new intelligence tsar to oversee the activities of the CIA and more than a dozen other intelligence agencies. Bush has not named the tsar.

"I think every American knows the importance of getting the best possible intelligence we can get to our decision-makers," Goss, 65, said.

Both men stressed that Goss' experience as an undercover CIA officer would help the agency bolster its ability to use spies, instead of just technology, to infiltrate terrorist networks. "The essence of our intelligence capability is people," Goss said.

Said Bush: "To stop them from killing our citizens, we must have the best intelligence possible."

11 August 2004

BRITS JOIN MAHDI ARMY

Two British men have joined the Mahdi Army of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in fighting coalition forces in Iraq, it has emerged. The two Iraqi-born men travelled to the holy Shia city of Najaf, the centre of the al-Sadr uprising, to take part in the battle against US forces besieging the city.

The two Londoners, an uncle and nephew with just two years between them, explained their motivation to The Times.

Interviewed by the newspaper in the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, they insisted that they were ready to die alongside their fellow Muslims in the country in which they were born.

The elder Briton told the newspaper: "It is our country and there are invaders here. We have taken the side of Muqtada al-Sadr because we believe it is the right side."

The tall, bearded, Arabic-speaking 23-year-old, who identified himself only by the nom de guerre Abu Hakid (Father of Fury), was asked why he came to fight. He replied: "It is evil against the angels."

His 21-year-old nephew, using the pseudonym Abu Turab (Father of Dust) added: "Bush said you are either with us or against us. We had to decide whether to be with him or against him, so we are against him, obviously."

Abu Hakid, who acknowledged that neither man had any military training, told the newspaper: "We went to fight last night. It was quite fun, actually." He conceded, however: "It was dangerous."

The two said they had held off going to Iraq until after the ousting of Saddam Hussein, because fighting to protect Saddam would have been the wrong cause. "It was evil against evil, so we let them beat each other up."

But al-Sadr's cause in seeking to expel the coalition forces from post-Saddam Iraq was just, they argued.

Donald Napier for Eye Spy

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