A COURTESY NOTE FROM EYE SPY INTELLIGENCE MAGAZINE: While every attempt has been made to confirm the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in this listing, Eye Spy Intelligence Magazine cannot be held responsible for inadvertent errors such as broken or non-existent links, new defined offices, or legislative structure changes within respective departments and agencies. Further research can be conducted by following the links provided, and via reference material contained within recommended books and published literature.... and of course - Eye Spy. Enjoy the material - Mark Birdsall - Editor

NSM  - Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet

(Norwegian National Security Agency/Authority)
http://www.nsm.stat.no/

NOTES: The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is a cross-sectorial professional and supervisory authority within the protective security services in Norway. The purpose of protective security is to counter threats to the independence and security of the realm and other vital national security interests, primarily espionage, sabotage or acts of terrorism. Protective security measures "shall not be more intrusive than strictly necessary, and shall serve to promote a robust and safe society," according to the NSM. The directorate was established 1 Jan 2003 and reports Minister of Defence (military sector) and Minister of Justice (civilian sector)

 

Director NSM Geira A Samuelsen

Tasks of NoNSA - legal/political fundament

* Security Act
* Defence Secrets Act
* Defence Inventions Act
* Arrangement on certification of information systems and products (SERTIT)
* Coordinating role in preventative work and responses against IT security breaches aimed at vital infrastructure in Norway. (NorCERT)

Tasks of NoNSA - Security Act

* Gathering and analysing of information relevant for protective security services

* Information, advice and guidance

* Oversight and Inspections

* Development of security measures (R&D when needed)

* National and international cooperation

* Monitoring of information systems

* Technical Security Counter Measures (TSCM)

* Production and accounting of CRYPTO-material

* Central Personnel and Facility Security Clearance Registry

* Body of Appeal when Security Clearance is denied

                               NSM Headquarters
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NSM ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

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NIS - Etterretningstjenesten
(Norwegian Intelligence Service)
http://www.mil.no/etjenesten/english/start/

NOTES: The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) is Norway's only foreign intelligence service. The NIS Director General is directly subordinated the Chief of Defence Norway. The current Director General of the Norwegian Intelligence Service is Major General Torgeir Hagen (pictured).

 

Major General Torgeir Hagen

The NIS provides information on developments outside of Norwegian territory and contributes to maintaining Norway's sovereignty. The Norwegian Intelligence Service collects, processes and analyses information relevant to Norwegian interests; information on other states, organisations and individuals. The NIS keeps close track on events and global developments and provides relevant information to the Norwegian authorities within its area of responsibility.

On behalf of the Chief of Defence Norway, the Director General shoulders the responsibility for co-ordinating and providing advice on all intelligence-related activities within the Norwegian Armed Forces.

Following the end of the Cold War, the NIS has been presented with a number of new challenges. The Intelligence Act was passed in 1998, and the Regulations to the Act were presented in 2001. International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and supranational environmental issues are new key areas for the Norwegian Intelligence Service.

The NIS has a number of land-based collection sites and has for many years made use of a vessel for monitoring of military activities, collection of intelligence information and military research in the Northern region, the "F/S Marjata".

Legislation

The Intelligence Service Act of 1998 and the Instructions to the Intelligence Service of 2001 enacts the legal framework for the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS). The NIS is a civil-military foreign intelligence service and is integrated in the Armed Forces. The Minister of Defence has constituted responsibility for the service. The NIS shall collect, assess and analyse information regarding Norwegian interests as related to foreign powers, organisations or individuals, and on the basis of such information develop analyses of threats and assessment of intelligence, in order to contribute to securing important national interests.

These tasks include e.g. international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, supranational environmental challenges, support to Norwegian forces taking part in military missions and support to military alliances. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issues a document defining tasks in operational terms and their category of priority. These tasks may also be supplemented by ad-hoc requests for information, i.e. as long as they are assessed to be within the legal framework, and serving important national interests.

The legal framework states e.g. the rules of jurisdiction to conduct intelligence operations. It is crucial that the operations are within the tasks for the service. All collection-methods are authorised if sanctioned by MoD. There are however limitations regarding the NIS's possibility to conduct operations against Norwegian citizens and organisations.

International law may commit national legislation. In this context, the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) is of particular interest.

                                               NIS Headquarters

Official Statement of the NIS

NIS is obliged to operate within the interest of: "...national security, public safety or the well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others," if the service finds it necessary to violate the right to privacy, to fulfil its tasks. Thus the Convention sets a legal framework for national legislation, and with that, for the NIS.

In a democratic society some human rights, amongst others:

* the right to privacy

* freedom of thought, conscience and religion

* freedom of expression and

* the freedom of assembly and association

can be limited in the interest of national security and public order. Within the Council of Europe's sphere of authority, the ECHR presupposes that such limitations be made in accordance with law.

Case law of the European Court of Human Rights says that security and intelligence services can only exercise their special powers if they are regulated by law. The following conditions must be filled to qualify as a law under the quality of law test:

- a norm must be adequately accessible and formulated with sufficient precision, to enable the citizen to adhere to the norm

- a rule needs to possess the essential characteristics of foreseeability and must not allow the exercise of unrestrained discretion

- a rule must at least set up the conditions and procedures for interference.

THE ROYAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. OSLO, NORWAY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACT (September 1998)
(Unofficial translation)

* 1. Objective.

The objective of this Act is:
a. to enable the Intelligence Service effectively to detect and counteract external threats against national independence and security, and against other important national interests, and
b. to secure public confidence in, and to safeguard the basis for the oversight of, the activities of the Intelligence Service.

* 2. The Organisation of the Intelligence Service.

The Intelligence Service is fully integrated with the Norwegian Armed Forces.
The Chief of Defence is responsible for the Intelligence Service. The Chief of Intelligence is directly subordinate to the Chief of Defence and acts as his adviser in all questions pertaining to intelligence issues.
Further regulations regarding the organisation of the Service are laid down by the King.
( In this context, "King in Council", i.e. the Cabinet. The MOD may however be given this authority. )

* 3. The responsibilities of the Intelligence Service.

The Intelligence Service shall collect, assess and analyse information regarding Norwegian interests as related to foreign powers, organisations or individuals, and on the basis of such information develop analyses of threats and assessment of intelligence, to the extent required in order to contribute to securing important national interests, including (but not limited to):

a. formulation of Norwegian foreign, defence and security policies,
b. contingency planning and correct handling of incidents and crises,
c. long-term planning and structural development inside the Armed Forces,
d. efficiency of the operational units of the Armed Forces
e. support to any military alliance in which Norway takes part,
f. (support to) Norwegian forces taking part in international military operations,
g. supply of information about international terrorism,
h. supply of information about supranational environmental problems,
i. supply of information about various forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and equipment as well as material for producing such weapons, and
j. the foundation for Norwegian participation in international agreements on disarmament and arms control, as well as ensuring that such agreements are maintained and followed up.

The Intelligence Service may establish and maintain intelligence cooperation with other countries.

The Intelligence Service shall ensure the nation's ability to collect and distribute information and intelligence to the Norwegian authorities in case of a partial or complete occupation of the country.

Further instructions related to the responsibilities and the operation of the Service are laid down by the King.

* 4. The relationship to individuals and organisations in Norway.

On Norwegian territory, the Intelligence Service shall not monitor or in any other covert way actively collect information about Norwegian individuals or organisations.
The Intelligence Service can only hold information concerning such individuals or organisations if the information has direct relevance to the conduct of intelligence commitments in accordance with * 3, or is directly connected to the work or assignment of the said persons or organisations on behalf of the Intelligence Service.

* 5. Archives.

All information which has been collected or generated by the Intelligence Service shall be systematically stored in archives which are adequately protected and not accessible to others, with the exception of Intelligence Service personnel with legitimate need-to-know access, and other persons whose professional duties include supervision and oversight of intelligence matters.
Further regulations related to the archive systems of the Intelligence Service are laid down by the Chief of Defence.

* 6. Oversight.

The Intelligence Service is answerable to the Parliament's Oversight Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services, in accordance with the provisions of and pursuant to the Act of 3 February 1995, No 7, regarding the oversight of the Intelligence and Security Services.
The King may establish special arrangements in order to ensure that intelligence activities have taken place within the framework of applicable legislation, and according to administrative or military directives and non-statutory law, and to ensure that legal protection and other relevant considerations are maintained.

* 7. Entry into force.

The King decides the date of entry into force of this Act.
(Act entered into force on 20 March, 1998)
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FFI - Forsvarets Forskningsinstitut
(Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)
http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english

NOTES: The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) is organised as an administrative agency subordinate to the Ministry of Defence and is the prime institution responsible for defence-related research in Norway. Its principal mission is to carry out research and development to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces. FFI is the chief adviser on defence-related science and technology to the political and military leadership. A particular task for the institute is to investigate aspects of the development in science and military technology that can influence our security policy or defence planning.

FFI consists of scientists and engineers trained in various disciplines such as mathematics, physics, information technology, chemistry, biology, medicine, psychology, political science, history and economics.

The Establishment is also the chief adviser on defence-related science and technology to the Ministry of Defence and the Norwegian Armed Forces' military organization.

Official Statement on FFI

The demand for expert and flexible armed forces requires continuous renewal and Norway's continued emphasize on defence technology keeps FFI busy. It is a true challenge to make significant contributions to the development of the Armed Forces - both in its principal national defence role as well as in its various roles as an effective participant in international security operations.

Relevant defence research now requires international cooperation. In order to maintain a position at the forefront of science and technology within chosen sectors, FFI collaborates with national and international scientific institutions and industry. The Establishment also has a close working relationship with its partners and customers.

Demand for FFI's research increases as the nature of armed conflict evolves. New communications technologies in new areas of conflict and for new means of protection from biological and chemical weapons are just two of the fields where FFI is currently investing resources. The overall goal is to enable men and women in uniform to be more effective in the field and ensure safety on the job, as well as their safe return.

FFI addresses these challenges through a broad spectrum of research topics ranging from the assistance of operational units to the support of national security policy via defence planning and technology studies.

FFI is located at Kjeller, 2 km north of Lillestrom and 25 km from Oslo, with easy access by train, bus or car. FFI also have a research unit in Horten.

The area around FFI is home to a variety of research institutes, technology centres, colleges, universities and some of the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation. Altogether they employ some 3,000 people

FFI Analysis Division
NOTES:
* Defence analysis
* Cost analysis
* Security policy

FFI's Analysis Division is one of Norway's most important centres for applied defence and systems analysis, and enjoys a close collaborative relationship with sister organisations in several countries. It describes itself an organisation that is "creative, broadminded, daring and responsible research institute. These characteristics also describe our employees."

The division carries out a broad spectrum of analyses to aid the Norwegian Armed Forces in long-term defence planning and the decision-making process. Its purpose is to advise Armed Forces concerning the organisation's future structure, composition and operations as the needs of the respective branches adapt to changing security challenges. The work in the division covers all aspects of defence analyses, including cost analyses, effectiveness analysis, computer simulation, war-gaming, broad studies of future technologies, security policy studies and scenario development.

The division performs cost-effectiveness analyses as part of defence analyses or in support of acquisitions of specific weapon systems. It also performs studies of vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure of an increasingly interconnected society and recommends measures to reduce this vulnerability. Most of the security policy studies perform research about the threat from terrorism and countermeasures against it.

The Analysis Division also assists the Ministry of Defence by providing counsel on business policy and industrial strategy in connection with materiel procurements for the Armed Forces, military offset schemes and international collaborations on military materiel.

Projects span a number of different fields of expertise, ranging from mathematics and science to economics and security policy. A number of military officers are assigned to the division's various projects at any given time, anchoring its analytic work firmly to the Armed Forces and making full use of the vital expertise and perspective brought to the projects by military professionals.

FFI Information Management Division

NOTES:
* Network based defence
* Information operations
* Modelling and simulation technology

The Information Management Division has 65-70 employees. Most of the division's projects are aimed towards joint level of the Armed Forces. The work of the division is divided into three principal areas of research:

The division has a staff of about 30 working on network based defence infrastructure and decision support, i.e. all network based defence activities that are not directly related to weapons or sensor technology. Projects include from technology-intensive research in information and communications systems, or as it used to be defined a few years ago, "C2IS and communications" to "softer" areas of study related to organisational structure and the management of human resources.

Another major area of focus for the Information Management Division is military information operations, in which around 30 persons are engaged. Ongoing work in this field includes projects in electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO).

FFI's work in EW includes the protection of larger platforms such as fighter aircraft and helicopters, communications electronic warfare and electronic support measures. In that missiles are either infrared or radar homing missiles, systems of protection include both infrared EW (IR-EW) and radar EW. Platform protection encompasses both radio communications and radar electronic support measures (ESM).

CNO is a relatively new field that has become increasingly important as society becomes steadily more interconnected and vital systems of infrastructure become more network-based.

The third major area of activity for the Information Management Division is modelling and simulation technology (M&S). Currently this is only a small field (about five employees), but it is expected to become a growth area for both FFI and the Armed Forces. Simulators for training purposes and experimentation are obvious areas of application, but the use of M&S in connection with military procurements and training for special missions (mission rehearsal) continues to grow in importance.

FFI Land and Air Systems Division
NOTES:
* Concept and systems development
* Operational experimentation
* Basic research in ionosphere physics and nanotechnology

The primary task of the Land and Air Systems Division is to contribute to the modernisation and transformation of the Armed Forces, more specifically, Norwegian ground forces and the air force by providing flexible operational capabilities suitable for tackling the altered nature of today's security challenges. The division aims to qualitatively improve the mission capability of the Armed Forces, ensuring that it has relevant operational capacity at all times by providing relevant technological solutions that are both effectual and cost effective.

This is accomplished through long-term and applied research and development (R&D), concept development and experimentation (CDE), testing and evaluation, concept and system development for aircraft, land vehicles, artillery, air defence, sensors, missiles, and ammunition. Division research is particularly focused on surveillance technology, air and ground based combat systems and guided weapons.

The Land and Air Systems Division is actively engaged in the Armed Forces plans to modernise and qualitatively improve the Norwegian army to a smaller, but more flexible and effective force. This transformation process entails the replacement and/or upgrading of armoured combat vehicles, indirect fire and the establishment of new ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance) capabilities. Other areas in which the Land and Air Division contributes valuable technical expertise and counsel include Armed Forces plans for the procurement of new fighter aircraft, the introduction of unmanned air vehicles (UAV), smart weapons and innovative uses of satellite information.

The Land and Air Systems Division also runs FFI's basic research program in ionosphere physics and technology with the goal of being among the world's leading scientific authorities within certain selected niches. The division carries out extensive research in this field, working in well-equipped laboratory with the use of state of the art tools to take comprehensive measurements and analyse data.

FFI's Land and Air Systems Division encompasses a wide span of technological areas, but the majority of the current projects are weighted in the fields of electronics and engineering cybernetics. Activities are organised into projects usually lasting three years. Projects are run as collaboration between FFI and the Armed Forces in which a close working relationship is established between FFI personnel and military officers assigned to specific projects. The division also participates in a wide range of international collaborations.

FFI Maritime Systems Division
NOTES:
* Concept and systems development
* Operational experimentation
* Marine environment studies

The main thrust of the work of the Maritime Systems Division is to contribute to the transformation and modernisation of Norwegian maritime forces through the development and provision of relevant technical solutions and expertise. It is engaged in both long-term and applied research and development, with ongoing projects in experimentation, test and evaluation, concept and systems development for frigates, missile torpedo boats, and submarines. The division is also engaged in concept and systems development involving vessels utilised in sea mine warfare and autonomous underwater vehicles and the interface between them.

R&D at the Maritime Systems Division is particularly focused on marine environment combat systems, combat management systems, sensor systems, navigation systems, and communications and weapons systems. A detailed knowledge and understanding of the geophysical conditions that affect these systems and how to capitalise on these conditions is a key element in the division's work, as is the study of how sensors and weapons systems influence the marine environment.

The division strives to devise readily applied technological solutions that give greater value to the Armed Forces as a whole and to the Norwegian Navy in particular. There is a close interchange between military professionals and division staff that keeps the work correctly oriented and relevant to the needs of the Armed Forces. A number of officers are assigned to certain projects at all times.

The work of the Maritime Systems Division is carried out both at FFI headquarters at Kjeller and at Horten. A broad spectrum of technical fields is represented in the backgrounds of the research staff, including acoustics, signal processing, systems architecture, engineering cybernetics, physics, mathematics, chemistry, computer science, data processing, combat systems, sonar systems, geophysics, computer technology, communications, navigation, meteorology, and biology.

The depth of the division's human resources opens for participation in a wide range of projects; these projects in turn directly benefit in quality from the contributions of individuals with quite different backgrounds pulling together to achieve good results.

The division has numerous international contacts, and actively seeks highly competent research associates who are working in full time positions at universities and technical colleges, both inside Norway and abroad.

FFI Protection Division
NOTES: * Threat assessment
* Vulnerability analysis
* Protective measures

The Protection Division is a national centre of expertise in protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons.

We work with threat assessment, vulnerability analysis and protection measures. Competence in these areas is contingent upon the understanding of how nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and conventional weapons work and the kind of effect they have. The Protection Division makes assessments of the existing contingency plans and makes recommendations for improvements, both within the Armed Forces and in the civil sector. The division also develops techniques for detecting the use of WMD, as well as the development and testing of protective equipment and medical treatment for nerve gas poisoning.

The Protection Division studies the physiological consequences to the human body of intensive operations in cold climates with little rest and minimum sustenance.

The activities of the Norwegian Armed Forces are subject to stringent environmental restrictions. FFI carries out research in the problem of environmental pollution by heavy metal in Norwegian shooting and exercise ranges and studies the consequences of removing contaminated lake sediment and placing them in a waste disposal site.

The rapid transition towards a network based defence also affects the way in which the individual soldier will operate and the type of equipment he or she will carry. The Protection Division works in close cooperation with the Armed Forces on NORMANS, a collaborative effort in developing the soldier of the future. NORMANS encompasses protective gear, sensors, weapons and communications. The Armed Forces are deeply committed to the security of our soldiers, and to that end, FFI is developing modern protective equipment for land vehicles and camp areas.

Much of the division's expertise is also applicable to tasks within the civil sector.
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USEFUL FFI ORGANISATION CHART
 

________________________________________________________________________

PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
NOTES: The Norwegian Committee for Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services was established in 1996 by the Parliament. The committee's responsibility is to monitor the three covert services in Norway: the Norwegian Police Security Service, the Norwegian National Security Authority and the Norwegian Intelligence Service.

The Committee inspects the headquarters of the Police Security Service six times a year, the National Security Authority headquarters four times a year and the headquarters of the Norwegian Intelligence Service twice a year. External duty stations of the services are also regularly inspected. Both these minimum number of inspections of headquarters, and the minimum number of local inspections for each service, are stated in our instructions. If necessary, more inspections can be held.

Advance notice of inspections is given, but unannounced inspections can also be held.

* This presentation was held at the Workshop on the Handbook on "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector", Bucharest 29-30 March 2004. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

MOD - Forsvarsdepartementet
(Ministry of Defence)
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd.html?id=380

Haeren
(Norwegian Army)
http://www.mil.no/haren/start/;jsessionid=FXOQ0U1ILXLVRQFIZYGSFEQ?_requestid=138471

Luftforsvaret
(Norwegian Air Force)
http://www.mil.no/luft/start/RNoAF/

Sjoforsvaret
(Norwegian Navy)
http://www.mil.no/sjo/start/;jsessionid=FXOQ0U1ILXLVRQFIZYGSFEQ?_requestid=139020

________________________________________________________________________

Justis- og Politidepartementet
(Ministry of Justice)
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd.html?id=463

________________________________________________________________________

Forsvarsnett
(Defence Net)
The official information service of the Norwegian defence ministry
http://www.mil.no/start/;jsessionid=QMY2GRU2T4YY1QFIZYGSFEQ?_requestid=
14496904

________________________________________________________________________

Forsvarsstaben
(Military High Command)
http://www.mil.no/fst/start/;jsessionid=QMY2GRU2T4YY1QFIZYGSFEQ?_requestid=14496992

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PST - Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste
(Police Security Service)
http://www.pst.politiet.no/default____162.aspx

NOTES: The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) is part of the Norwegian police service. Administratively, and in our preventive activity, PST reports directly to the Ministry of Justice. In criminal investigations and prosecution matters, PST is under the authority of the Director General of Public Prosecutions and the Public Prosecutors' Offices.

It is responsible for preventing and investigating criminal activities linked with terrorism; with illegal intelligence gathering; with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of equipment, material or technology which can be used in the production or employment of such weapons; or with violent extremism. It also falls within PST's remit to counter threats towards Members of the Royal Family, Members of the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting), Cabinet Members, Members of the Supreme Court, and dignitaries representing similar foreign authorities.

Furthermore, our service has an advisory function with respect to other Norwegian authorities. Among the duties we carry out in this capacity is the issuing of threat assessments. Our threat assessments are delivered to the Ministry of Justice and other relevant bodies of authority, either merely to serve as written briefs, or also additionally to form bases for decisions. Their contents are classified in pursuance with the Security Act.

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) prepares on an annual basis a threat assessment outlining anticipated developments within PST's areas of responsibility. The threat assessment, which is classified, is based on several sources of information including PST's operational activity, assessments by partner agencies and input from other institutions with relevant expertise. The focus of the threat assessment is Norway and Norwegian security interests and the timeframe is the year ahead.

Special Tasks: PST investigates offences against the security and independence of the State. PST is a specialist body within the police.
All of PST's activities are regulated as duties assigned by the Norwegian Parliament pursuant to the Police Act. The Ministry of Justice has laid down a Code of Practice specifically for The Norwegian Police Security Service, which provides further details of PST's remit and the way in which its duties are to be carried out. Beyond this, the Government and Ministry of Justice are tasked with setting the priorities for the Service.

PST's main activity is operational policing. Carrying out analyses and compiling reports are important support functions. PST's activities entail the prevention and investigation of offences. Guidelines are drawn up by the Norwegian Parliament covering the types of offences which PST is to combat. The Ministry of Justice expands on these regularly.

The statutory basis for PST's major areas of work is Chapter IIIA of the Police Act (Act no. 53 of 4 August 1995 concerning the police). Section 17 b of the Police Act stipulates that PST shall prevent and investigate

* offences against the Penal Code Chapters 8 (crimes against the security and independence of the State) and 9 (crimes against the Norwegian constitution and head of state), the Defence Secrets Act and the Security Act,

* illegal intelligence activity (espionage),

* proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of equipment, material and technology that facilitate the production or use of such weapons (anti-terrorism),

* offences against provisions in or pursuant to the Act relating to control of the export of strategic goods, services and technology, etc. and the Act relating to the implementation of binding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council or other legislation relating to similarly special measures, and

* sabotage or politically motivated violence or coercion, or offences against sections 147 a and 147 b of the Penal Code.
Section 17 c of the Police Act stipulates further that The Norwegian Police Security Service's Headquarters shall:

* prepare threat assessments for the political authorities,
* co-operate with foreign police, security and intelligence services, and
* carry out checks on individuals for use in security vetting.

Organisational Structure

The Norwegian Police Security Service is run from the Headquarters in Oslo, and has local offices in all police districts outside Oslo.

The Norwegian Police Security Service is part of the Norwegian police service, and is under the direct authority of the Ministry of Justice. We have national responsibility in specialist policing areas as determined by the Norwegian Parliament.

The chiefs of police in all police districts in the country with the exception of Oslo manage PST activities in their respective districts. They report to the Director General of The Norwegian Police Security Service in relation to PST matters.

The Commissioner of Police in Oslo Police District is exempted from duties within the remit of PST, and overall responsibility for PST activities in Oslo Police District rests with the Headquarters. PST activity in other police districts in the country is co-ordinated by and run from the Headquarters.

OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON PST'S COUNTERTERRORISM FUNCTION

The objective of PST's counter terrorism work is both the prevention of terrorist acts being planned and perpetrated in Norway, as well as the prevention of Norway being used as a staging post for planning or perpetrating terrorist acts in other parts of the world.

Terrorism is a very serious offence, which has an international dimension in the vast majority of cases. Terrorist acts mainly affect civilians - i.e. "soft targets". Additionally, the effects of terrorism extend beyond injuries and the loss of human life, by creating a climate of fear and insecurity.

Our role in counterterrorism

In Norway the police are the ones responsible for terrorism preparedness and counter terrorism in peacetime. PST is responsible for preventative counter terrorism, and for carrying out covert investigations. The rest of the police service is responsible for putting in place the security measures that are necessary for our national preparedness, and, where necessary, for conducting overt investigations of circumstances connected to terrorist activities. If requested to do so, PST may render specialist support to the rest of the police in this area. In a case in which the Norwegian Armed Forces participate in counter-terrorism activities in peacetime, e.g. by securing public buildings, the military personnel work under the direction of the police.

PST's main responsibility is the prevention of terrorism
PST's counter terrorism work concentrates mainly on individuals with possible connections to terrorist networks, and investigating whether plans are being made, or support provided for carrying out acts of terror. In this work, we utilise all powers available under Norwegian law. The objective is to intercept plans to commit acts of terrorism well before they can be carried out.

Official Statement on Counterintelligence

Counter intelligence entails activity carried out with the objective of preventing and combating illegal intelligence activity aimed at Norway. Illegal intelligence activity is any activity which aims to obtain information about the political, military, technological or other sector of importance to society, and which can harm the country's security, interests and independence.

What is illegal intelligence activity?

Intelligence activity entails collecting information which the collector regards as relevant. Intelligence activity is in principle lawful as long at it entails collecting information from publicly available sources, e.g. the mass media, public documents and records, etc. If the collector believes that publicly available information is not publicly available, the collection activity can, however, be regarded as an offence.

Industrial espionage carried out by another state with the help of that state's intelligence agencies is also regarded as illegal intelligence activity. Other branches of the police deal with industrial espionage carried out by one competing business against another for commercial purposes.

Illegal intelligence gathering also includes refugee-related espionage. Refugee-related espionage encompasses intelligence gathering by another country directed at foreigners in Norway. The goal of this type of activity is to undermine, neutralise or eliminate political opposition by monitoring, investigating and threatening opposition figures in exile. Norway has seen various cases of refugee-related espionage through the years.

Targets

The methods used by intelligence organisations in information gathering have in many ways changed in line with developments in recent years. But the recruitment of agents continues to be a main means of obtaining access to sensitive and extremely valuable information.

Technology, science, the economy and the environment are key targets for foreign intelligence activity. Additionally, political and military affairs continue to be high priority targets for intelligence services.

Gathering intelligence on political targets mainly relates to infiltrating the political or bureaucratic networks, either to gather information or to exert the desired influence on Norwegian politics. Different political players and participants in the political decision making processes can therefore be of interest to foreign intelligence services.

Intelligence is gathered in relation to a number of public bodies, ministries, political institutions, businesses, financial institutions, educational and research institutions as well as humanitarian organisations. The police, intelligence service and security service are also interesting targets for foreign intelligence gathering.

More than just classified material

Foreign intelligence services are not only interested in classified information. Unclassified information about the organisational structure, case management procedures, decision-making processes and strategic assessments can be just as useful for a foreign state. That the subject serves in interesting positions or has valuable networks can also be the reason why a foreign country's security service directs its attention to an individual.

Advice and assistance to individuals at risk

If someone holds a post, an office or has a contact network that causes them to be of interest as the target of espionage, it can often be difficult to determine whether they are actually being or have been the subject of an espionage operation. An intelligence officer will usually proceed extremely cautiously and gradually, and take a long time to build a good relationship with a potential informant. The majority of people who are subject to such problematic approaches tend to experience an extremely smooth transition from natural questioning and signs of positive interest, to more intrusive questions and suggestions relating to the exchange of various types of services.

One of PST's objectives in its counter intelligence work is to provide assistance to individuals subjected to espionage. A person who feels that they are subject to unusual levels of attention from an unexpected quarter, or who is in doubt as to whether a particular contact is seeking more information than they ought to require in the "normal" run of things, can contact PST to discuss these concerns. PST needs information that can contribute to uncovering illegal intelligence activity, and we can support and provide guidance to people who are subjected to such activity. It is important to determine as early as possible whether any suspicion is well founded, so that the damage can be minimised in a case in which an intelligence drive is in fact in progress. If it turns out to be a false alarm, this will still have the benefit of removing the anxiety and insecurity of the person who informed us of their concerns.

Security Vetting

Security vetting involves collecting information that is relevant in evaluating whether a person should be given security clearance. A security clearance is a decision that a person is allowed access to classified information.

The requirement for security clearance as a means of protecting classified information is laid down in the Security Act. Chapter 3 of the security vetting regulations provides further details on the way in which security vetting should be carried out. (Security clearance in the legal sense refers to personnel who have access to classified information, having been vetted and deemed fit for acquiring this responsibility.)

The National Security Authority (NSM) is responsible for the protective security service.

NSM is responsible for professional and vetting issues within the protective security service. The Authority therefore carries out security vetting in all clearance procedures in Norway in both the civil service and the Armed Forces. PST assists the Authority in security vetting by collecting personal data for the purpose of the clearance procedure.

The need for security cleared personnel

People who in the course of their work will access or are required to handle classified information must get security clearance before they can gain access to the classified information. Clearance is given at different levels, depending on the classification of the information to which the person needs access. The classifications in Norway are Restricted, Confidential, Secret and Top Secret.

PST does not decide which positions and tasks in the Norwegian public service and private sector require security clearance. Applications and questions about security clearance must be sent to the National Security Authority, and not PST. We are, however, under a duty to lay down requirements for security clearance before we give classified information to people who are not working at PST. In addition, we ensure that all PST employees have security clearance.

PST's Full Role - including evaluation of subjects

* Counterterrorism
* Counterintelligence
* The threat[s]
* Targets
* Perpetrators
* Possible sanctions
* Damaging effects
* Non-proliferation
* Counter extremism
* Security advice
* Threat assessments
* Dignitary protection
* Security vetting

How PST Works
 

Official Statement on Duty of Secrecy

Employees in the police service must comply with a number of provisions relating to a duty of secrecy. Handling information that is classified on grounds of national security also triggers a duty of secrecy. As PST has a greater need than the rest of the police service to deal with classified information, PST's employees will in many instances be under a duty of confidentiality that is also based on national security considerations.

Duty of Secrecy Lasts a Lifetime

An exception is that in particular circumstances a decision may be taken to relieve a person from the duty of secrecy. Otherwise, every duty of secrecy is presumed to last a lifetime. The duty persists even after the person in question's position, assignment, or office has been terminated.

The Reasoning Behind the Duty of Secrecy

The duty of secrecy for the police and prosecuting authority shall in part protect individuals or groups of individuals who are affected by our work, against their sensitive information falling into the wrong hands.

The specific duty of secrecy that relates to classified information is justified with regard to national independence and security and other critical national security interests.

Security Classification Calls for a Duty of Secrecy

Most of the information handled by PST has contents that are classified pursuant to the Security Act and related regulations.

In addition to the duty of secrecy itself, classified information entails a duty to protect the information in particular ways; for example, by keeping classified information in a safe which has a combination lock. This requirement derives from the Security Act and related regulations, which stipulate that anyone who has access to classified information in the course of their work, assignment or by virtue of their office is under a duty to prevent the information getting into the wrong hands.

The security levels under the Security Act and related regulations are TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and RESTRICTED.

The Data Protection Code of Practice also calls for a duty of secrecy
The public administration's duty of secrecy is enhanced by the Data Protection Code of Practice, which relates to information that needs to be protected for reasons other than those outlined in the Security Act and related regulations. When information is deemed by the Security Act to be classified, this increases the general duty of secrecy.

When the conditions for classification under the Data Protection Code of Practice have been met, the information shall be classified as follows: STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL is used if the result of the information getting into the wrong hands could be significant damage to public interest, a business, an institution or an individual. CONFIDENTIAL is used if the result of the information getting into the wrong hands could be damage to public interest, a business, an institution or an individual.

Intelligence Collection

In order for the police to combat crime, we are dependent on reliable information. PST needs reliable and relevant information in order to prepare threat assessments and other security advice as well as in order to prevent and investigate criminal activity. As is the case with the rest of the police service, PST collects information from a number of different sources.

We have been given special powers for collecting information. Please see the Information Collection menu option for further information.

Different Sources of Information

PST is able to collect a large quantity of information from open sources: research reports, scientific literature, the mass media, etc. Our case officers may need information from such publicly available sources in order to keep abreast of professional developments, and in order to progress a particular case.

In addition, we need information not intended for public disclosure, but which can be critical in preventing serious crime or in solving violations that have already taken place. This can, for example, be information from police databases, from domestic and foreign partner organisations, or from people who have observed suspicious incidents.

Protecting our Sources

In many cases, the police must avoid public disclosure of sources of our information. A number of provisions, including rules concerning the duty of secrecy, enable us to protect our sources. Protecting our sources is important for two reasons. Firstly, the police must prevent the identity of people who give us sensitive information from being revealed. Secondly, it is important to prevent suspects from gaining access to information discovered by the police until the police's work is finished.

Protecting Information

As noted above, the police need to prevent the wrong parties from gaining access to the information we collect. Since PST handles a large amount of classified information, we must also take the provisions in the Security Act into account when considering which information we can disclose to third parties.

When we receive information that has been marked classified by others (for example foreign security services) the owner of the information decides whether we can disclose the information to third parties, and if so, to whom. Therefore, PST cannot be presumed to be able to disclose information we have received from others.

Handling Information

It is important that all information that is collected is quality controlled. Quality control relates to assessing the credibility of the source, comparing different pieces of information, filling any gaps in the information and discarding irrelevant or incorrect information. This sorting process is extremely important, and is undertaken continually until a case is closed.

Part of the information we need is information concerning certain individuals. Our handling of such information is subject to the general rules of the Personal Data Act, which lay down clear terms for the collection, storage and destruction of personal data.
Chapter IV of the PST Code of Practice contains the rules that apply specifically to PST's handling of information.

Statutory Authority

All activities carried out by PST must be in accordance with existing primary and secondary legislation. It cannot decide who or what it protects, or what kind of criminal activity it focuses on combating. It must act in accordance with the responsibilities given by the Norwegian Parliament, Government and the Ministry.

The Norwegian Parliament also lays down the primary rules about how we PST carries out its duties. The principal bases for PST's policing work are the Criminal Procedure Act, Police Act and Data Protection Act. The legislative framework drawn up by the Norwegian Parliament is generally supplemented by regulations.
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POT - Politiets overvakingstjeneste
(Police Security Service)
NOTES: Domestic intelligence gathering, counterespionage and counterterrorism responsibilities. POT reports to Norway's Ministry of Justice.
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DSB - Direktoratet for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap
(Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning)
http://www.dsb.no/

NOTES: DSB aims to maintain a full overview of risk and vulnerability for society in general. It aims to promote measures which prevent accidents, crises and other undesired incidents and to ensure sufÞcient emergency planning and efÞcient management of accidents and crises.

DSB aims to help prevent loss of life, protect health, the environment and material assets in connection with accidents, catastrophes and other undesired incidents in times of peace, crisis and war.

The Directorate is responsible for monitoring fire and electrical safety, hazardous substances and product safety. It also act as the professional authority for the fire service and the emergency planning measures of county governors. DSB is responsible for Civil Defence, the National Training Centre for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and the Fire Academy.

DSB was established on 1 September 2003. It is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and the Police and its head office is located in Tonsberg.
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NorCert - Internettsikkerhet
(Norwegian Computer Emergency Response Team)
http://www.nsm.stat.no/Engelsk-start-side/English2/

NOTES: NorCERT coordinates preventative work and responses against IT security breaches aimed at vital infrastructure in Norway. It alerts officials of serious attacks, threats and other vulnerabilities related to serious IT security.

NorCERT is a department of the Norwegian National Security Authority (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet - NSM).

NorCERT's tasks include:

* Coordinating responses to serious IT security breaches against vital infrastructure and information.

* Gathering information related to serious IT security threatening incidents

* Coordinating early patching of serious vulnerabilities in vital computer systems in our society.

* Sharing information with other response teams regarding new threats.

* Having an up-to-date view of IT related threats.

* Assisting other response teams and aiding national readiness measures.

* Being Norway's point of contact for similar organizations abroad.

Official Statement of NorCert

The Internet - A Vulnerable Arena for Attacks

A few years ago it was necessary to have extensive knowledge of networking in order to access the Internet. The Internet is now available to almost anyone who can access a computer.
Almost everything in both the public and private sectors depend on Internet access today. The amount of vulnerabilities in these sectors has therefore increased considerably in recent years. Well-organised ICT attacks intended to disable, damage or make benefit of computerized functions in society may harm Norway's vital infrastructure.

Detection, notification and incident handling

NorCERT prepares Norway for a potential ICT crisis.

Our IT security precautions include:
* Reducing our society's ICT vulnerabilities
* Reducing the probability of potential crisis

Once a crisis occurs, NorCERT aims to:
* Respond correctly ASAP
* Limit the extent and consequences of the crisis

Facts about NorCERT:

Formally established: 1st January 2006.

NorCERT is an operational department in NSM consisting of two integrated sections:

* VDI , Varslingssystem for Digital Infrastruktur, is the Norwegian Alert and Early Warning System for Digital Infrastructure identifying, classifying and issuing warnings about IT attacks against Norway.

* Incident Handling is Norway's national centre coordinating the handling of attacks against vital Norwegian ICT security.

* Together both sections operate the Operation Centre. Where we maintain an up-to-date view of the ICT threat assessment.
In our offices located at Akershus Fortress we are:

* Available 24/7

* Altogether approximately 20 IT-security specialists, aided by conscripts with experience and competence in IT.

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USEFUL GOVERNMENT LINKS
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The Office of the Prime Minister
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk.html?id=875

NOTES: The office of the Prime Minister assists the Prime Minister in leading and coordinating the work of the Norwegian Government.

Office of the Attorney General
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/The-Office-of-the-Prime-Minister/The-Office-of-the-Attorney-General-.html?id=408557

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud.html?id=833

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