A COURTESY NOTE FROM EYE SPY INTELLIGENCE MAGAZINE: While every attempt has been made to confirm the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in this listing, Eye Spy Intelligence Magazine cannot be held responsible for inadvertent errors such as broken or non-existent links, new defined offices, or legislative structure changes within respective departments and agencies. Further research can be conducted by following the links provided, and via reference material contained within recommended books and published literature.... and of course - Eye Spy. Enjoy the material - Mark Birdsall - Editor
 

The Australian Intelligence Community consists of eight organizations that combine oversight, assessments, and collection of intelligence information.

* National Security Committee of Cabinet
* Secretaries Committee on National Security
* Office of National Assessments (ONA)
* Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
* Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)
* Defense Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
* Defense Signals Directorate (DSD)
* Defense Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)
 

ASIS - Australian Secret Intelligence Service
http://www.asis.gov.au/

NOTES: The Australian Secret Intelligence Service is Australia's overseas intelligence collection agency. Policy Statement: Mission is to protect and promote Australia's vital interests through the provision of unique foreign intelligence services as directed by Government. Primary function is to obtain and distribute intelligence information, not readily available by other means, about the capabilities, intentions and activities of individuals or organisations outside Australia, which may impact on Australian interests, and the well-being of its citizens.

ASIS operates under the control of the Director-General, who is appointed by the Governor-General. The Director-General, under the Minister, is responsible for managing ASIS and must advise the Minister in matters relating to ASIS.

_________________________________________________________

The Functions of ASIS

ASIS's function is stated in the Intelligence Services Act 2001. Its role is to:

* collect foreign intelligence, not available by other means, which may impact on Australian interests;
* distribute that intelligence to the Government, including key policy departments and agencies;
* undertake counter-intelligence activities which protect Australian interests and initiatives; and
* engage other intelligence and security services overseas in Australia's national interests.

The Government expects ASIS to be adaptable, and to be able to respond effectively to the diverse threats and opportunities confronting our nation. ASIS's work can involve collection of intelligence in relation to national defence, international relations and economic issues. ASIS is also expected to contribute to Australia's coordinated national efforts against terrorism, proliferation of weapons and other trans-national concerns.

ASIS is not a law enforcement agency. It is required by law not to plan for or use violence in its activities. Recent amendments to its legislation empower ASIS to provide for the protection of its people, but beyond that do not alter the fact that ASIS does not use violence in carrying out its function.

ASIS's Place in Government

Oversight

ASIS is responsible to the Government through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, under the Intelligence Services Act 2001, and is part of the Foreign Affairs portfolio. ASIS's Director-General is directly responsible to the Minister. ASIS is subject to Parliamentary oversight through the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS, and DSD which reviews ASIS's expenditure and administration, and other matters referred to it by the Minister or either House of Parliament. The legality and propriety of ASIS's activities are overseen by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, who reports to the Prime Minister annually. ASIS also produces a classified Annual Report.

Establishment and the Maintenance of Secrecy

ASIS was established on 13 May 1952 but the agency was not publicly acknowledged until 1977. The then Prime Minister informed Parliament that "ASIS's capacity to serve Australia's national interest will continue to depend on its activities being fully protected by secrecy." This statement has been reaffirmed by successive Government reviews.

ASIS has important obligations to protect those who work with it, and to protect the information it obtains. These obligations are enshrined in the Intelligence Services Act 2001. ASIS attaches the utmost importance to security and the protection of sources of intelligence.

Priorities and Tasking

ASIS obtains intelligence in response to priorities determined by other Government agencies. These priorities are set within the framework of critical interests determined by Government.

Key agencies involved in the setting of intelligence tasking for ASIS include the Office of National Assessments (ONA), the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Defence and various agencies within the Defence portfolio. ASIS's tasking is subject to ongoing review.

The Australian Government places a high value on intelligence capabilities and outputs, and on ASIS being a strong, professional and vibrant organisation well equipped to meet Australia's intelligence requirements in a global environment and to assist in securing the well-being of all Australians.

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACT 2001 - SECT 6
Functions of ASIS

(1) The functions of ASIS are:

(a) to obtain, in accordance with the Government's requirements, intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia; and
(b) to communicate, in accordance with the Government's requirements, such intelligence; and
(c) to conduct counter-intelligence activities; and
(d) to liaise with intelligence or security services, or other authorities, of other countries; and
(e) to undertake such other activities as the responsible Minister directs relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia.

(2) The responsible Minister may direct ASIS to undertake activities referred to in paragraph(1)(e) only if the Minister:

(a) has consulted other Ministers who have related responsibilities; and
(b) is satisfied that there are satisfactory arrangements in place to ensure that, in carrying out the direction, nothing will be done beyond what is necessary having regard to the purposes for which the direction is given; and
(c) is satisfied that there are satisfactory arrangements in place to ensure that the nature and consequences of acts done in carrying out the direction will be reasonable having regard to the purposes for which the direction is given.

(3) A direction under paragraph(1)(e) must be in writing.

Note: If the Minister gives a direction under paragraph(1)(e), the Minister must give a copy of the direction to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security as soon as practicable after the direction is given to the head of ASIS (see section32B of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986).

(4) In performing its functions, ASIS must not plan for, or undertake, activities that involve:

(a) paramilitary activities; or
(b) violence against the person; or
(c) the use of weapons;

by staff members or agents of ASIS.

Note 1: This subsection does not prevent ASIS from being involved with the planning or undertaking of activities covered by paragraphs(a) to (c) by other organisations provided that staff members or agents of ASIS do not undertake those activities.

Note 2: For other limits on the agency's functions and activities see sections11 and 12.

Note 3: For paramilitary activities see section3.

(5) Subsection(4) does not prevent:

(a) the provision of weapons, or training in the use of weapons or in self-defence techniques, in accordance with Schedule2; or
(b) the use of weapons or self-defence techniques in accordance with Schedule2.

(6) ASIS must not provide weapons, or training in the use of weapons or in self-defence techniques, other than in accordance with Schedule2.

(7) In performing its functions, ASIS is not prevented from providing assistance to Commonwealth authorities, including to the Defence Force in support of military operations, and to State authorities.

ASIS Mission and Values

To protect and promote Australia's vital interests through the provision of unique foreign intelligence services as directed by Government.

The ASIS Values - Official Statement

The ASIS Values comprise the Values of the Australian Public Service (APS) which we have adopted in full, in addition to a number of ASIS-specific values which extend beyond those of the APS.

We are committed to the ASIS Values, and will uphold and promote them in our relationships and in everything we do.

Our Core Values are:

* The highest levels of professionalism and service,
* The highest respect for the national interest and for national security,
* The highest standards of personal discipline and accountability, including the provision of full, timely and honest accounting in all work and security matters,
* A fair, equitable and supportive workplace,
* Professionalism and courtesy, and
* Responsive and relevant service.

The Values we have adopted from the APS are:

* ASIS is apolitical, performing our functions in an impartial and professional manner, which includes the carrying out of decisions and the prompt, conscientious and effective implementation of programs, together with the provision of advice which:
* as far as practicable, represents the facts accurately;
* is sensitive to the intent and direction of government policy; and
* is as comprehensive as practicable in setting out the advantages and disadvantages of the main options available and their consequences.

* ASIS is a Service in which employment decisions are based on merit;
* ASIS provides a workplace that is free from discrimination, and recognises and utilises the diversity of the Australian community we serve;
* ASIS has the highest ethical standards. Our people must take the utmost care to ensure they are not acting unnecessarily, carelessly or arbitrarily. Special care should be taken in relation to the use of information obtained;
* ASIS is accountable for our actions, within the framework of Ministerial responsibility to the Government, the Parliament and the Australian public;
* ASIS is responsive to the Government for providing frank, honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice, and in implementing the Government's policies and programs;
* ASIS delivers our services fairly, effectively and courteously;
* ASIS has leadership of the highest quality;
* ASIS establishes workplace relations that value communication, consultation, co-operation and input from our people on matters that affect their workplace;
* ASIS provides a fair, flexible, rewarding and, where practicable, safe workplace;
* ASIS focuses on achieving results and managing performance;
* ASIS promotes equity in employment;
* ASIS provides a reasonable opportunity to all eligible members of the community to apply for ASIS employment;
* ASIS is a career-based service to enhance the effectiveness and cohesion of Australia's democratic system of government; and
* ASIS provides a fair system of review of decisions taken in respect of our people.

Accountability

ASIS's Legislative Basis: Accountability and Oversight

The Intelligence Services Act 2001 (the Act), which came into effect on 29 October 2001, provides the legislative basis for ASIS's ongoing existence. The Act details the functions of ASIS, provides limited immunities under strictly defined circumstances for the conduct of ASIS's activities, and establishes a Parliamentary Joint Committee to review the administration and expenditure of ASIS, and also that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD).

The Act details the accountability and oversight regime governing ASIS. It makes explicit the role of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in directing ASIS and authorising the conduct of specific activities, particularly those which may have a direct impact on Australians overseas. In conjunction with the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, the Act emphasises the role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), an independent office-holder who assists Ministers in overseeing Australia's security and intelligence agencies. The IGIS has access to all ASIS reporting and carries out detailed operational audits to ensure that ASIS acts in accordance with Australian law and conducts its activities with propriety. The IGIS also oversees the operation of Rules to Protect the Privacy of Australians made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Intelligence Services Act 2001. The Inspector-General reports annually to the Prime Minister, who tables the report in Parliament.

Additionally, in accordance with the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Auditor-General Act 1997, ASIS's financial statements are audited annually by the Auditor-General.

Budget

ASIS prepares both Budget and revised budget statements as part of the Additional Estimates process. ASIS's agency budget statements are included in the Foreign Affairs and Trade Portfolio budget related documents.

A copy of ASIS's current and prior years Budget and Additional Estimates budget statements can be located on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade budget web page.

_________________________________________________________

Minister for Foreign Affairs
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/
_________________________________________________________

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/index.htm

NOTES: On Friday 2 December 2005 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD became the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Further predecessors to this committee include:

* Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation; and
* Joint Select Committee on the Intelligence Services.
_________________________________________________________

ASIO - Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
http://www.asio.gov.au/

NOTES: The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is Australia's national security service. Its functions are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (the ASIO Act).

ASIO Official History Courtesy ASIO

Significant Events in ASIO's History

The following is a synopsis of the major events which led to ASIO's establishment in 1949 and significant events since. It is not a chronology of espionage or terrorist events in Australia, nor is it a history of ASIO, although significant publicly known ASIO operations are included.

The information is based on publicly available material such as ASIO's Annual Reports, reports of Royal Commissions, reports by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, all of which should be accessible through public libraries.

As ASIO is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act 1982, it is not possible to obtain current information regarding ASIO's operations. However, information which is more than thirty years old may be accessed using the access and exemption provisions of the Archives Act 1983.

1915-1949 Overview

Australia had several security organisations between 1915 and 1949 beginning with the formation of a branch of the British 'Central Counter-Espionage Bureau' as part of an Empire-wide apparatus. Some organisations were civilian and some were military or with significant military involvement.

In 1945 a cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko, defected from the Soviet Embassy in Canada and provided evidence of Soviet plans to use local communists and sympathisers to obtain defence and military information - especially material relating to atomic research and techniques for production of atomic weaponry.

In the late 1940s the formation of the Soviet Bloc under the Warsaw Pact generated widespread public fear of a third World War and the era of Cold War confrontation began.

Against this background a US/UK code breaking operation, called Venona, targeting encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications operated in great secrecy. Operation Venona had started in the US in February 1943. Venona information showed sensitive Australian government information was being passed to the Soviet Union from a source in Australia. Venona identified a 'spy ring' operating in Australia being run from the Soviet Embassy.

In the years before 1949, officers of the United Kingdom's Security Service made several trips to Australia to inform the government of the security leaks and to report back to the UK on the security situation in Australia.
1949

On 16th March 1949 Prime Minister Ben Chifley issued a 'Directive for the Establishment and Maintenance of a Security Service' to Mr Justice Geoffrey Reed appointing him Director-General of Security and directing him to establish a security service. The annual budget for the new security service was £115,000.

The security service was established to investigate the leads being provided by Operation Venona so as to identify the group of people in Australia spying for the Soviet Union. Within the security service this became known as 'the Case'. Officers from the United Kingdom's Security Service worked with the new service and passed on leads generated by Operation Venona.

The other responsibility of the security service was to vet people for suitability for access to classified information i.e. to provide security assessments.

In August 1949 Justice Reed advised the Prime Minister he had decided to call the service the 'Australian Security Intelligence Organisation'.

1950s Overview

During the 1950s ASIO's major focus was 'the Case'.

Vladimir Petrov and his wife Evdokia, both agents of the Soviet Ministry of State Security at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, defected in 1954. As a consequence the Soviet Embassy closed on 29th April 1954 and did not re-open until 4th June 1959. The first accredited diplomat, when the Embassy re-opened in 1959, was First Secretary Ivan Fedorovich Skripov.
1950

On 6th July 1950 Prime Minister Robert Menzies issued an expanded and more specific Directive titled 'Charter of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization' (sic) on the appointment of Colonel Charles Spry as the new Director-General of Security.
1951 ASIO Headquarters moved from Sydney to Melbourne.

Sydney Headquarters

1954 While 'the Case' was being investigated ASIO was also running an operation against the Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, an officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MVD) - a forerunner to the KGB.

Petrov defected to Australia on 3rd April 1954 at the end of his posting. He had been subject to several false accusations by the Soviet Ambassador which could have led to imprisonment back in the Soviet Union.

On 13th April Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced the defection in Parliament and that a Royal Commission would be established to inquire into espionage activities in Australia.

A week later there were dramatic scenes at Mascot airport as two Soviet couriers 'escorted' Petrov's wife Evdokia, also an MVD officer, aboard an aircraft to return to Moscow. Later, while the plane refuelled in Darwin, Mrs. Petrov also defected after speaking to her husband by telephone.

The Royal Commission on Espionage was established on 3rd May 1954 and finished in August 1955. Both Petrovs gave evidence. The Royal Commission reported that "... it plainly appears that for many years the Government of the U.S.S.R. had been using its Embassy at Canberra as a cloak under which to control and operate espionage organizations in Australia."

1956 ASIO was put on a statutory footing, instead of the purely executive basis on which it had stood since establishment. No change was made to ASIO's functions. The ASIO Act 1956 came into effect on 13th December 1956.

1960s Overview

ASIO's main focus in the 1960s continued to be
Soviet espionage and subversion.

Australia became involved in the Vietnam War in the early 1960s. The second half of the decade was marked by large-scale anti-Vietnam War demonstrations which continued through to the early 1970s.

In 1963 nine Australian members of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood carried out an incursion into Yugoslavia where they were arrested, tried and imprisoned for various terms. A tenth person was arrested in Germany.

1960 The Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1960 received assent. The Act enabled ASIO to seek warrants from the Attorney-General to intercept telephone communications, although the practice had existed since 1949.

Also, because of deficiencies identified by the Royal Commission on Espionage relating to espionage during peacetime, the Crimes Act 1914 was amended to change the provisions relating to espionage and breaches of official secrecy and to include sections covering treason, treachery and sabotage.

1963 Soviet First Secretary Ivan Skripov was declared persona non grata because he had been engaged in elaborate preparations for espionage. Since 1961 Skripov had been cultivating a woman who was actually an agent for ASIO. After a series of training runs, Skripov tasked the agent to deliver a package to a person in Adelaide. The package contained a message sender which, when used with a transmitter, enabled coded messages to be sent by radio at several hundred words per minute. (Around that time, a similar device had been found in the home of a UK couple convicted of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.) The package also contained a coded list of Russian transmission timetables. The agent's appointed contact in Adelaide did not show up for the meeting and she was unable to deliver the package. Rather than risk having the device used in Australia the government declared Skripov persona non grata.

1970s - Overview

Terrorist attacks that had begun in the late 1960s continued throughout the 1970s.

Organisations opposed to the existence of Israel struck at vulnerable international targets. The murder of 11 Israeli Olympic team members at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games by the Black September organisation and several plane hijackings were just some of the many incidents which caught world attention. Ideologically motivated European terrorist groups also became active conducting a series of bombings and assassinations.

In 1972, a bomb exploded at the Yugoslav General Trade and Tourist Agency in Sydney. Sixteen people were injured, two critically. Also in 1972 there was a second incursion by Australians of Croatian background into Yugoslavia.

On 13th February 1978 a bomb exploded in a garbage bin outside the Sydney Hilton Hotel where delegates to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting were staying. Three people were killed and six others severely injured.

1973 On 15th and 16th March, Attorney-General Lionel Murphy made highly publicised visits to ASIO's Canberra office and Melbourne Headquarters (the 'Murphy raid') to examine ASIO documents relating to Croatian extremist activities in Australia; and to ask questions about arrangements for the protection of the Yugoslav Prime Minister who was to visit Australia later that month.

1974 On 21st August 1974 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced the appointment of Mr Justice Robert Hope of the Supreme Court of New South Wales as Royal Commissioner to inquire into Australia's intelligence agencies. This was known as the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS).

1977 Justice Hope completed RCIS. He confirmed the need for Australia's own security intelligence agency. He made many recommendations on improving ASIO's analytical capability, dissemination and communication of information, information storage and retrieval, financial accountability, Ministerial control, security assessments for access to classified information and for immigration cases, and on cooperation with police and foreign intelligence services. Significant recommendations were that:

* areas of ASIO investigation be expanded to include sabotage, terrorism and what Justice Hope referred to as 'active measures' by foreign agents interfering in Australia

* ASIO be given lawful authority to open mail, enter premises, to use listening devices and intercept telegrams and telex under warrant

* a Security Appeals Tribunal be established where people who were subject to unfavourable security assessments could appeal the assessment

* ASIO produce a classified Annual Report for the Minister

* the Director-General should keep the Leader of the Opposition regularly informed of security matters

* ASIO's Headquarters be relocated to Canberra.

In November ASIO advertised publicly for the first time for Intelligence Officers. This flowed from one of the recommendations of RCIS. Before this time potential Intelligence Officers were approached for recruitment. It was at this point that ASIO first employed women as intelligence officers.

1978 Following the Hilton Hotel bombing the Government commissioned Justice Hope to conduct a review of protective security arrangements for the Commonwealth and on Commonwealth/State cooperation on protective security.

The Government decided ASIO's Headquarters should move from Melbourne to Canberra.

1979 Justice Hope's Protective Security Review Report designated ASIO as the agency responsible for producing national threat assessments in the field of terrorism and politically motivated violence. Justice Hope also recommended that relations between ASIO and State and Territory police forces be regulated by arrangements made between governments.

A new ASIO Act was passed by parliament and put into effect many of the RCIS recommendations.

1980s Overview

In December 1980 the Turkish Consul-General in Sydney, Sarik Ariyak and his bodyguard, Engin Sever, were murdered by the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.

In December 1982 the Israeli Consulate-General and the Hakoah Club in Sydney were bombed.

A bomb exploded on 23rd November 1986 beneath the Turkish Consulate-General in Melbourne killing one of the bombers. Another person was later convicted for his part in the crime.

In its 1986-87 unclassified Annual Report, ASIO reported it assessed that approximately fifty foreign officials in Australia had an undeclared intelligence role or were otherwise engaged in acts of foreign interference. Their activities included interference in their respective emigre communities, intelligence activities directed against diplomatic representatives of third countries, and attempts to gain access to protected information and technology.

1980 ASIO Act 1979 came into effect, having been passed by Parliament in 1979. At the same time the Security Appeals Tribunal as recommended by Justice Hope was established.

The ASIO Staff Association was formed to represent all staff in matters affecting their terms and conditions of employment.
1982 The Church of Scientology brought a court action against the Director-General, the Attorney-General and the Commonwealth seeking declarations that it was not a threat to security; and the Director-General was acting beyond his powers under the ASIO Act in gathering information about the Church, communicating that information to other persons and characterising it as a security risk. The action was unsuccessful.

In its decision, the Court considered the meaning of the term 'relevance to security' used in the ASIO Act. The court found it was not possible to suggest any rational test by which 'relevance to security' could be defined. The court found that it may be 'relevant to security' to determine that a person is not a risk to security just as it would be relevant to security if they were a risk. The court also found that while initial intelligence may establish that a person is not a security risk, it does not preclude ASIO from collecting further intelligence about the person.

1983 In April 1983 Valeriy Ivanov, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra was declared persona non grata on the grounds that he had carried out duties incompatible with his diplomatic status. ASIO had assessed he was an officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

Following the considerable publicity surrounding Ivanov's expulsion the Government established a Royal Commission, again under Justice Hope, to review the activities of Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies (RCASIA).

In an unrelated development the Security Appeals Tribunal, when reviewing an unfavourable ASIO security assessment of a person who was a member of the Australian Communist Party, ruled that membership of the Communist Party of Australia did not warrant a recommendation against the grant of access to classified national security material. A nexus between the applicant and particular activities of security interest needed to be shown.

The Attorney-General tabled in parliament an unclassified version of ASIO's Annual Report for the year ended 30th June 1983. This was the first unclassified report produced by ASIO.

1984 The Archives Act 1983 was proclaimed. Within ASIO work began to transfer relevant ASIO records to Australian Archives and facilitate public access to these records within the provisions of the Archives Act.

In December 1984 Justice Hope completed his report on RCASIA. The major recommendations related to ASIO's functions and matters of legality, propriety and accountability. The recommendations included that:

* the security related activities which ASIO should investigate be redefined. References to subversion and terrorism be removed and replaced with politically motivated violence, attacks on Australia's defence system and promoting communal violence

* the matter which Justice Hope had called 'active measures' by foreign agents in RCIS be replaced with a new item 'acts of foreign interference'

* ASIO be given additional functions of collecting foreign intelligence and providing protective security advice

* provision be made for the Minister to issue guidelines to the Director-General on the performance of ASIO's functions, and

* a separate office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security be established.

Justice Hope also recommended that the ASIO Act expressly provide that it is not the purpose of the Act that the right of lawful advocacy, protest or dissent should be affected or that exercising those rights should, by themselves, constitute activity prejudicial to security.
1985 ASIO designated an officer as Media Liaison Officer. The Director-General emphasised at the time that public comment would not be made on operational activity but to provide better understanding of ASIO's functions, limitations and responsibilities, and the standards of accountability, legality and propriety it maintains.

The Director-General issued a specific denial of the allegation that ASIO had a role in the bombing of the Hilton Hotel in Sydney in 1978.

1986 The ASIO Act 1979 was amended giving effect to recommendations made by Justice Hope in RCASIA. The amended legislation also established the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO.
ASIO's new Central Office in Canberra, replacing the Melbourne Headquarters, commenced operation on 2nd December 1986

Central Office, Canberra

1989 A permanent site for testing protective security equipment was established in the ACT.

1990s - Overview
The 1990s saw the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact.

The beginning of the decade saw the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the Gulf War. Later came conflict in the Balkans.

Terrorist attacks became more lethal. There was an increase in the number of terrorist attacks where individual incidents caused heavy casualties. There was a shift in the organisational structure of terrorist groups with small, loosely-connected groups acting in concert.

Civilian paramilitary anti-government groups became prominent, often based around New World Order conspiracy theories.

On 6th April 1992 several Mujahideen e-Khalq supporters vandalised the Iranian Embassy in Canberra and assaulted embassy officials.

Preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games began.

In June 1995 the honorary French Consulate in Perth was set on fire in protest against France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the Pacific.

In February 1999 sixty-five pro-Kurdistan Workers Party protesters occupied the Greek Consulate-General in Sydney protesting the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan. (Ocalan had been sheltering in the residence of the Greek Ambassador to Kenya from where he was expelled and taken to Turkey.)

1990 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security published his findings on allegations that the (now abolished) Queensland Police Special Branch had improperly transferred to ASIO a number of 'files' which should have been destroyed. He found that ASIO had acted legally and with propriety in its handling of information passed to it by the Queensland Police. He also recommended that those records held by ASIO which were not relevant to security should be destroyed.

ASIO devoted considerable resources in late 1990 to security investigations during the build up to the Gulf War.

1991 From the beginning of the Gulf War in mid-January until March ASIO was involved in intensive investigations related to the war.

National Action member, Perry Whitehouse, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for the murder of fellow member Wayne Smith. ASIO listening device tapes had recorded the murder and were produced in evidence at the trial.

ASIO introduced cost recovery for protective security advice at the end of 1991.

1992 In early 1992 the Government commissioned a review 'of the overall impact of changes in international circumstances on the roles and priorities of the Australian intelligence agencies'. A statement made by Prime Minister Paul Keating on 21st July 1992 included the following paragraphs:

Consistent with the philosophy of a separation of the assessment, policy and foreign intelligence collection functions, the Government considers that the existing roles of the individual agencies remain valid in the 1990s. The rationale outlined by Mr Justice Hope for ASIO as a freestanding, non-executive, advisory intelligence security agency remains relevant in the 1990s and the Government has therefore decided that ASIO should continue to have the roles and responsibilities laid down in existing legislation.

The Soviet threat certainly formed an important component of ASIO's activities, but threats from other sources of foreign interference and politically motivated violence have been important to ASIO for some time, and will remain so. However, the implications for ASIO of the changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are more far-reaching than for the other agencies. The Government has therefore decided that while ASIO's capacity to meet its responsibilities must be maintained, there is scope for resource reductions.

The resource reductions for ASIO were a cut of 60 staff and a $3.81 million budget decrease, both to occur over a period not exceeding four years.

In April the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO released its report on the effects of the access provisions of the Archives Act 1983 on the operations of ASIO. The government accepted the Committee's recommendations that:

* records that might identify a person as an ASIO source, agent or operative are to be guaranteed exemption from disclosure for a period of 30 years after the death of such a person (based on a notional life span of 75 years),

* information received from a foreign service carry the same protection from public access as it has in its country of origin, and

* the Security Appeals Tribunal which heard appeals against unfavourable security assessments and appeals under the Archives Act relating to ASIO records, should be replaced with a 'Security Division' within the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Following the 6th April assault on the Iranian Embassy in Canberra, the Government commissioned a review of the adequacy and appropriateness of counter terrorism procedures.

In late 1992, the Director-General publicly denied ASIO authorship of a document claiming to reveal that members of various ethnic groups were spying within the Macedonian community. Similarly, he denied a report that ASIO was monitoring or investigating aboriginal activists.

1993 Following a lengthy joint investigation by ASIO and the Australian Federal Police, an ASIO officer, George Sadil, was arrested in June and charged under the Crimes Act 1914 with several espionage and official secrets related offences.

Sadil was committed for trial in March 1994 but, on reviewing the evidence, the Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to proceed with the more serious espionage-related charges. Sadil pleaded guilty in December 1994 to thirteen summary charges of removing ASIO documents contrary to his duty, was sentenced to three months jail, and released on a twelve month good behaviour bond.

Concerned about the implications that material had been removed from ASIO without authority, in October the Prime Minister announced the appointment of Mr. Michael Cook AO (former head of the Office of National Assessments) to conduct an inquiry into various aspects of national security. Mr. Cook completed his review in 1994.

1994 The Parliamentary Joint Committee completed a review into the security assessment process. Among other recommendations, the Committee recommended that ASIO's practice of not charging for security assessments be continued.

1995 ASIO began preliminary planning for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

1997 ASIO's management was restructured to enable it to operate within budget and align management numbers and levels with the overall downsizing following government wide resource reductions. An Olympics Coordination Branch was created.

1998 As part of its Olympic preparations ASIO began recruiting staff with specialised skills, strengthened information collection and analytical systems, monitored changes in the security environment more broadly, improved its communications technology and provided other agencies with strategic security intelligence assessments to assist their Olympics security planning.

The Olympics Coordination Branch began planning for the Federal Olympic Security Intelligence Centre (FOSIC) to provide security intelligence advice and threat assessments to State and Commonwealth authorities during the Sydney 2000 Games.

ASIO began addressing relevant recommendations of the Australian National Audit Office report into Commonwealth security planning for the Sydney 2000 Games

1999 ASIO celebrated its 50th Anniversary.

To help ASIO meet the demands and challenges of the current and future intelligence environment the ASIO Act was amended by Parliament. The amendments mean ASIO is:

* able, under warrant approved by the Attorney-General, to use tracking devices, to access data in computers and to open mail carried by private mail contractors

* permitted to enter premises after a warrant has expired, to remove a listening or tracking device

* permitted to collect foreign intelligence by using non-technical means (e.g. using agents). Until this change ASIO could only collect foreign intelligence by technical means (i.e. under warrant)

* able to pass information received from overseas liaison partners to Australian law enforcement agencies

* allowed to charge non-Commonwealth agencies for protective security and security assessment advice

* able to give security assessments for the Sydney 2000 Games direct to State and Territory authorities until 31 December 2000

Other changes to the ASIO Act now mean that:

* search warrants issued to ASIO are valid for 28 days, as opposed to the previous duration of 7 days, and may come into force on a specified day after issue of the warrant or when a specified event happens

* the Minister may appoint a person to act as Director-General. Previously it was only the Governor-General who could make such an appointment.

* the Director-General will be able to issue any type of warrant in an emergency, except a warrant to collect foreign intelligence.

On a minor note, the spelling of the word 'Organization' in ASIO's name was amended to replace the 'z' with an 's'. This brings the spelling into line with current Australian standard.

The Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 and the Taxation Administration Act 1953 were amended to enable ASIO, for security purposes, to access information held by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC); and for the Taxation Commissioner to disclose tax information to ASIO. ASIO's access to AUSTRAC information will be governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed between the Director-General of Security and the Director, AUSTRAC. ASIO's access will be audited by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in accordance with the terms of a separate MOU between the Inspector-General and the Director, AUSTRAC. ASIO's access to Australian Tax Office (ATO) information will be governed by an MOU between the Director-General of Security and the Commissioner of Taxation and will also be auditable by the Inspector-General. ASIO's access to and use of AUSTRAC and ATO information is subject to the strict secrecy provisions in the Financial Transaction Reports and Taxation Administration Acts.

2000 An intensive three-year program of preparations for the Sydney Olympics was finalised and ASIO activated the Federal Olympic Security Intelligence Centre on 1 May 2000 to provide security intelligence advice and threat assessments to State and Commonwealth authorities during the Games.

The success of the Commonwealth's security support to the New South Wales Police was demonstrated by the absence of incidents and the completion of the safest Games in modern history. By the end of the Paralympic Games ASIO had provided more than 151,000 Olympic-specific security assessments for people accredited to the Games, provided 24,784 security clearances for the entry to Australia of some Olympic family members and other visitors, and issued 532 Threat Assessments specifically related to Olympic security. ASIO also made overt contact with 98 communities as part of a Community Interview Program designed to establish a channel of communication for any concerns relating to Olympic security, and to explain ASIO's role in that context. 57 people of specific security interest were also interviewed to assist in the prevention of politically motivated violence during the Games.

Amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act commenced operation on 22 June 2000. These amendments enhance ASIO's ability to advise Government on threats to security and to collect foreign intelligence, by enabling ASIO to be better placed to meet the challenges of new technology. In particular, ASIO may obtain telecommunications interception warrants targeting named persons if a telecommunications service warrant would be ineffective. This will provide the flexibility necessary to compensate for targets using multiple services in order to defeat investigation.

The Attorney-General launched the ASIO Web site at Parliament House on 22 June 2000, providing a single point of access to all publicly available ASIO material, including employment opportunities.

In September 2000 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO completed an inquiry into 'The nature, scope and appropriateness of the way in which ASIO reports to the Australian public on its activities'. The Committee found that 'the total package of information available to the Australian community about ASIO's operations exceeds that available to citizens in other countries about their domestic intelligence agencies', and made a number of recommendations concerning ASIO's website.
_________________________________________________________

LISTING ASIO PUBLIC RELEASES
http://www.asio.gov.au/Media/PublicStatements.aspx

_________________________________________________________

DIO - Defence Intelligence Organisation
http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/

NOTES: The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) is an intelligence assessment agency that provides services and advice at the national level. Its mandate is to support Defence and Government decision-making and assist with the planning and conduct of Australian Defence Force operations. DIO is located in Canberra and is one of four organisations that make up the Intelligence and Security Group in the Department of Defence.

DIO is responsible for assessing military intelligence that focuses on global security activity, terrorism, defence economics, military capabilities, and science and technology that has military applications.

DIO's intelligence product and services help inform its customers on military activities at home and abroad, defence acquisition processes, force readiness decisions, strategic policy, foreign relations and defence scientific developments.

ABOUT DIO

In the post-World War II period, the Defence and national intelligence functions were shared between the Navy, Army and Air Force intelligence directorates and the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). The Bureau was responsible for geographic, infrastructure and economic intelligence - mainly in Australia's region. In 1957 its responsibilities were expanded to include scientific and technical intelligence. In 1970, the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) was formed from a merger of JIB with most of the foreign assessment elements of the three armed services. Following the first Hope Royal Commission and establishment of the Office of National Assessments in 1977, JIO was reoriented to focus more closely on Defence interests. The second Hope Commission endorsed these arrangements in 1984.

In 1989 Counter-Terrorism was added to JIO's responsibilities. Following a review of Defence intelligence in 1989 by the then MAJGEN John Baker, the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) was established in 1990 as Defence's sole strategic level, all-source intelligence assessment agency.

Official DIO Statements
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

DIO staff often get asked about the type of work they perform in DIO on a day to day basis. DIO analysis focuses on military and defence related topics. Our analysts predominantly work to support ADF operations, but more generally, the core business of DIO is to analyse and assess intelligence for the Defence organisation and Australian Government.

Intelligence analysis is a complex task involving the examination and assessment of information to draw conclusions about a particular topic. It is not an academic exercise because it does not involve philosophical theories. Instead, intelligence analysis is a function heavily dependant on realism and requires an objective approach to thinking. It is predominantly process driven, and it requires continuous exhaustive research using information from a variety of classified and non-classified sources. Analysis also involves the collation of information to identify relationships, expose indicators and filter factual evidence. This is a process that forces the questioning of information to confirm truths and probabilities. The next process is to scrutinise the information to recognise trends that will lead to an event or pattern. Once a conclusion about the information has been formed, an assessment is made which is then presented to customers so they can make well informed decisions based on our findings.

Typically, DIO analysts spend the majority of their time researching and analysing information, as well as presenting their assessments to DIO's customers. Analysts present their assessments in the form of plain English written and verbal product. This is purposely done to prevent confusion among our customers and minimise opportunities for debate on language issues.

DIO PRODUCT

In DIO, we call our published assessments 'Product'. These are intelligence assessments that have been rigorously checked and properly formatted for distribution to our customers.

Defence Economic Trends

This publication analyses significant trends in defence spending in the South-East Asia and South Asian regions. It draws together official defence budgets and national economic data to enable comparisons between countries and over time.

The Defence Economic Trends continues to use the methodology introduced in 2000 to compare defence funding trends in the region. Underpinning much of the analysis in this publication is a series of defence deflators that are used to convert nominal official defence expenditure into 'constant' terms. While there are some limitations to undertaking expenditure comparisons, our estimates aim to give readers the best available guide to the overall trend for spending on regional armed forces in real terms. For an explanation of the model and notes on comparing expenditure over time and between countries, please refer to AppendixA.

All defence expenditure figures relate to official defence budget estimates unless otherwise stated.

Gross domestic product and government expenditure are provided in both nominal and real monetary terms and in both local and US dollars to enable comparisons to be made over time and between countries.
_________________________________________________________

FAQs - FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
_________________________________________________________

What is the role of DIO?
The role of DIO is to provide defence related intelligence assessment, advice and services, primarily to the Minister of Defence and the Defence organisation, and to support the achievement of the defence mission - to ensure the defence of Australia and its interests.

What does DIO specialise in?
DIO is the Australian Government's source of expertise for matters relating to trends in global security, weapons of mass destruction, military capabilities, defence economics and transnational terrorism.

How is the organisation structured under the Department of Defence?
DIO is one four agencies that make up the Intelligence and Security (I&S) Group in the Department of Defence. The I&S Group is headed by a Deputy Secretary who reports to the Secretary of Defence and Chief of Defence Force. The other agencies that make up the group are the Defence Signals Directorate, Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation and the Defence Security Authority.

Is DIO a spy organisation?
No. DIO is an assessment organisation responsible for the analysis of intelligence only. DIO employees do not engage in covert 'spy' activities or collect intelligence of any kind.

Who are DIO's customers?
DIO customers predominately comprise the Minister for Defence, senior leaders of Australian Government, members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), senior Defence leaders and decision-makers and Defence policy planners.

Why does the ADF need your product?
Intelligence plays a key role in supporting the personnel of the ADF. While on operations the ADF are regularly confronted with hazardous situations, particularly if they enter an unfamiliar environment. DIO's priority is directed to supporting the ADF to ensure their safety while on deployment.

Why does Australian Government need your product?
The Australian Government requires timely, accurate and concise information in order to make decisions and implement policy. DIO's role is to ensure that the Australian Government receives the best intelligence assessments based on all the available facts at the time.

Can members of the public request DIO product?
DIO only disseminates its product to its registered customers and does not accept requests for product from members of the public. All product that is available to the public can be located on this website.

Can I request to be briefed by DIO analysts on a particular topic?
Analysts from DIO do not conduct briefs for the general public, special interest groups or the media. However, in the past, analysts have accepted requests for briefings from Defence industry representatives and private firms involved in global security awareness. Requests for briefs are judged on a case by case basis and should be made in writing to the Director, DIO.

I am about to go on holiday to a particular country. What travel advice can DIO provide me on this destination? DIO does not provide travel advisory information for members of the public, Defence employees or any other Government personnel. All inquiries pertaining to travel should be sought from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website; www.smartraveller.gov.au

How do I go about applying for a position in DIO?
Information on applying for a position in DIO can be found on this website under 'Careers'.

Do you have to be a specialist to work in DIO?
You do not have to be a specialist to work within our organisation. DIO is a leading intelligence organisation because it targets exceptional individuals during the recruitment process. Staff vacancies are open to people from all disciplines and we employ people who can offer a variety of skills and not just an academic qualification. When we recruit we look for habits of the mind, approach to solving problems and the capacity to think innovatively and form judgments.

Are all positions within DIO analytical positions?
No. There is a wide variety of non-analytical positions that exist within DIO. These positions allow people to develop and utilise skills in all areas of the business function. Both analytical and non-analytical positions are listed in DIO's current employment opportunities.

Is DIO a military organisation?
DIO is an integrated civilian-military organisation. This means that there are members of the Australian Defence Force and non-military employees of the Department of Defence that work together to deliver DIO intelligence services. This provides opportunities for personnel to work, learn and develop within a diverse employment environment.

Can I tell people that I work in DIO?
Yes. However DIO does suggest that it is in your own interests to be discreet and to limit the number of people who are aware of your employment within DIO, as well as your specific role or function.

What can I tell people about my work?
Due to the nature of the material and the context of work requirements within DIO, employees are required to restrict any work related discussions. This means that DIO employees need to limit their discussions about work with family and are not able to discuss their work or work issues with friends.

Where is DIO located?
DIO is located in the Australian Department of Defence complex in the suburb of Russell in Canberra. Russell is a centrally located suburb within a five minute drive from the centre of Canberra.

What are my Conditions of Service?
Your employment in DIO will be subject to the conditions of service outlined within the Defence Collective Agreement 2006 - 2009.

This current Certified Agreement expires on 30 June 2006. Subsequently, consultation is underway with Defence employees, leaders and staff associations (unions) to develop a successor agreement that supports Defence's and the Government's priorities as well as taking into account the views of staff.

Do I have to be an Australian Citizen to apply for a position within DIO?
To be considered for engagement as either an ongoing or non-ongoing employee, applicants must hold Australian citizenship or be eligible for Australian Citizenship and be actively pursuing citizenship and be eligible for consideration under existing Commonwealth Government Security Guidelines.

In addition to the above, applicants must have at least ten years of checkable background and be willing to undertake an extensive security and background checking process.

Do I require tertiary qualifications?
Not necessarily. Selection for positions in DIO are made on the basis of merit. Merit requires that an assessment be made on the basis of relative suitability of the candidates for the duties, using a competitive selection process. Work qualities that may be taken into account in making an assessment include:

* Relative abilities
* Qualifications
* Experience
* Standard of work performance
* Personal qualities, to the extent that the delegate has determined that these matters are relevant to the performance of the duties of the position; and
* The relative potential of each applicant for further development in the APS and the ability of each officer to perform the duties of other positions in Defence of the same or equal classification.


DIO values the contribution of a wide and diverse range of employees that utilise the knowledge, skills and abilities gathered from all areas of training, education and development. Particular emphasis is placed on written and oral communication skills, sound conceptual and analytical skills, and good judgement. An extensive range of training is provided to all staff in organisational specific skills, vocational training and leadership and management skills.

Do I need to speak foreign languages?
No. The ability to speak foreign languages is not essential to your application, but it may be advantageous for work in certain areas of DIO. Training is available to complement or initiate language skills for those interested personnel.

Can I send a resume to express my interest in working in DIO?
No. DIO does not accept unsolicited job applications in any form. If you wish to apply for a position within DIO you need to check DIO's current employment opportunities and send a personal particulars form, resume and statement of claims against the selection criteria to civilian recruitment by the closing date for applications. The contact details of two referees must be provided as interviews may not be conducted. Applicants must quote the appropriate job reference number (i.e. DIO/XXXX) in their application. Information on these requirements can be sourced from the civilian recruitment website at www.defence.gov.au/dcr/.

Where are DIO's current employment opportunities located?
DIO advertises its current employment opportunities in the employment section of this website, the Defence Civilian Recruitment website, the Australian Public Service Gazette, National Press and through SEEK. These sites provide useful information about applying for positions within the Australian Public Service and in particular the Department of Defence.

Where can I source further information about a position?
For all current employment opportunities DIO has a listed contact officer. The contact details for this person will be listed at the bottom of the position advertisement. The contact officer will be able to answer questions specific to the advertised position and working within DIO. It is strongly recommended that you contact this person before applying for a position within DIO as they will be able to clarify your understanding of the position and the requirements of working within DIO.

I already have a security clearance for my current job. Will that make the selection process quicker for me?
Not necessarily. Everyone applying for a position within DIO is required to go through the same recruitment process which includes an extensive security clearance process. The time required to complete this process may be reduced if an applicant has held a position requiring a security clearance in the past but this can depend on the type of clearance held, the agency for which the clearance was issued and how recently the clearance was issued or revalidated.

Am I able to have feedback for my unsuccessful application?
Yes. The selection committee can provide feedback on unsuccessful applications on request. This covers the applicant's performance in applications, interviews, assessment centres or any other assessment techniques used at that stage. Due to security considerations, DIO does not provide feedback on the outcomes of organisational suitability assessments.
_________________________________________________________

DSD - Defence Signals Directorate
http://www.dsd.gov.au/

NOTES: DSD is Australia's national authority for signals intelligence and information security. DSD has two principal functions: one is to collect and disseminate foreign signals intelligence (known as Sigint); the other is to provide Information Security (Infosec) products and services to the Australian Government and its Defence Force.

DSD's Infosec role is not classified, and various Infosec products and services can be accessed from the 'Infosec' button in the navigation bar at the top of the page (go to web site).

DSD's purpose is to support Australian Government decision-makers and the Australian Defence Force with high-quality foreign signals intelligence products and services. DSD makes Government and Defence policy more certain and more effective by providing the policy Departments and assessment agencies with important information that is not available from open sources. DSD also directly contributes to the military effectiveness of the ADF, and provides a range of information security services to ensure that their sensitive electronic information systems are not susceptible to unauthorised access, compromise or disruption.

The task of an agency such as DSD is increasingly complex and demanding. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has, paradoxically, become a much more uncertain place, and the Australian Government has to make quick decisions from a wide range of choices as it responds to political and economic imperatives. To do so, it needs timely access to the best information available, and intelligence is one of the sources on which it relies.

At the same time, the revolution in information technology has fundamentally changed the world we live in and the way we all do business. Modern communications technologies have ushered in the Information Age and the electronic marketplace. For DSD, for whom information is core business (we both collect and protect information), the new environment continually challenges us to look for new and better ways to fulfil our obligations to Australia's Government and Defence Force.

The Directorate's intelligence-related activities and operations are classified in the interests of national security.

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACT 2001 - SECT 7
Functions of DSD

The functions of DSD are:

(a) to obtain intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia in the form of electromagnetic energy, whether guided or unguided or both, or in the form of electrical, magnetic or acoustic energy, for the purposes of meeting the requirements of the Government, and in particular the requirements of the Defence Force, for such intelligence; and
(b) to communicate, in accordance with the Government's requirements, such intelligence; and
(c) to provide material, advice and other assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities on matters relating to the security and integrity of information that is processed, stored or communicated by electronic or similar means; and
(d) to provide assistance to the Defence Force in support of military operations and to cooperate with the Defence Force on intelligence matters; and
(e) to provide assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities in relation to:
(i) cryptography, and communication and computer technologies; and
(ii) other specialised technologies acquired in connection with the performance of its other functions; and
(iii) the performance by those authorities of search and rescue functions.

Note: For limits on the agency's functions and activities see sections11 and 12.

Official Statement - Working at DSD

To fulfil its mission, DSD relies on the utilisation of cutting-edge computing and communications technologies; for example, the Directorate operates a very powerful supercomputing complex.

But much more importantly, we rely on the quality, dedication and motivation of our workforce. What our people have in common is commitment and initiative, strong qualities of change leadership, and the capacity to respond quickly to new and complex issues and concepts.

DSD's personnel are dedicated to their work: it offers them challenges and rewards, both personal and professional, uncommon in most other public or private sector workplaces. If our people leave us, they generally do so reluctantly, and then only because the skills they have acquired after a few years at DSD make them highly sought after elsewhere in the public sector, or in industry.

If you are interested in a career with DSD, please look through the 'Careers' pages of this Website. You might also like to bookmark the 'Current vacancies' pages, which are continually updated, and come back every so often to see what openings are currently available.
Back to top

Sigint

Signals intelligence and information security have a long and honourable history in the service of the Australian Government and its allies in times of peace, crisis and conflict. The current generation of Australia's Sigint and Infosec professionals are proud to inherit that record, and to add their own contributions to it.

But it is a history little known to the public at large. Because of the secrecy that surrounds the business of intelligence collection, many of the great successes of Sigint cannot be revealed until many years later.

Some important aspects of Sigint's history have been declassified. Many readers will be familiar with the story of how the Allied cryptanalysts broke the allegedly 'unbreakable' Enigma cypher system used by the Germans during WWII - a feat that contributed in no small measure to the ultimate Allied victory. It was not until several decades after the War that it was safe to reveal the full story of Enigma.

More recently, in the mid-1990's, the US Sigint organisation, the National Security Agency, made the decision to release much of the material collected from Soviet diplomatic and intelligence targets during the 1940's, 1950's and later under an operation codenamed Venona.

The Archives Act 1983 contains some special provisions relating to intelligence agencies, including DSD. DSD continues to hold records that would otherwise be subject to public release after 30 years. It does so on the basis that release of this material would compromise ongoing national security interests, or Australia's obligation to protect the material that other countries have provided to us in confidence. In conjunction with National Archives of Australia, DSD has an active program to review this material, with a view to eventual public release.
_________________________________________________________

DSD Infosec
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/index.html

NOTES: DSD's Information Security Group plays a key role in the protection of Australian official communications and information systems. For information that is processed, stored or communicated by electronic or similar means, the role of the Information Security Group is:

* to provide material, advice and other assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities on matters relating to the security and integrity of information that is processed, stored or communicated by electronic or similar means; and

* to provide assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities in relation to cryptography and communications technologies

In addition to its support for Government Departments and authorities, the Information Security Group also plays an important role working with industry towards the development of new cryptographic products. In order to deal with the increasing requirement to evaluate information security products, DSD established the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Programme (AISEP) in 1995.

What Infosec means

Information security (Infosec) is usually defined as the combination of communications security (Comsec) and computer security (Compusec). The definition may also include radiation security (Radsec), which refers to emissions from devices such as monitors and printers (also known as TEMPEST). In short, the term Infosec relates to the security of any information that is stored, processed or transmitted in electronic or similar form. But what do we mean by security?

To the average person, "security" corresponds with "confidentiality"; that is, ensuring that information is available only to those people properly authorized to receive it. This is generally achieved through some form of encryption. However, "security" increasingly includes a number of other important factors:

* Integrity, which ensures that information has not been changed or tampered with;

* Availability, which ensures that communications and computing systems are not disrupted in their normal operations;

* Authentication, which ensures that a person accessing or providing information is actually who they claim to be; and,

* Non-repudiation, which ensures that a person is not able to deny the receipt of information if they have, in fact, received it.
_________________________________________________________

USEFUL RESEARCH LINKS
http://www.dsd.gov.au/library/index.html

_________________________________________________________

Australia National Security Hotline
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurityhome.nsf/Page/Hotline

NOTES: This web site provides a single access point for counter-terrorism information from the Australian Government.

The Australian approach to fighting terrorism is based on strong cooperative, coordinated and consultative relationships between the State and Territory governments, the Australian Government, and their departments and agencies.

This site also provides comprehensive information on the roles of Australia's counter-terrorism agencies, the coordination arrangements and the country's national counter-terrorism plan.
_________________________________________________________

IGIS - Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Australia
http://www.igis.gov.au/

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is a key element of the accountability regime for Australia's intelligence and security agencies listed here:

* Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

* Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)

* Defence Imagery & Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)

* Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)

* Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)

* Office of National Assessments (ONA)

The IGIS was set up under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 to provide independent assurance to the Australian government, the Parliament and the people that the agencies:

* conduct their activities within the law

* behave with propriety

* comply with ministerial guidelines and directives

* have regard to human rights

To guarantee independence of the office, the IGIS is appointed by the Governor-General for a fixed term and cannot be dismissed by the government. An IGIS can be reappointed only once.

The Inspector-General is located in the Prime Minister's portfolio.

The current Inspector-General is Mr Ian Carnell. He was first appointed in 2004 and was re-appointed in April 2007 for four years.

Prior to this Mr Carnell was Deputy Secretary, Criminal Justice and Security in the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department. Additional roles included Chairmanship of the CrimTrac Board of Management and the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council, and membership of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Mr Carnell has been a senior Commonwealth official for many years in the areas of administrative law, policy and program administration and fraud control and investigations.

He is currently also a member of the Administrative Review Council.

WHAT DOES THE IGIS DO?

The IGIS:

* regularly monitors what the intelligence and security agencies do

* conducts inquiries, either self-initiated or at the request of government

* investigates complaints about the agencies

* makes recommendations to government

* provides annual reports to the Parliament

The IGIS has extensive powers to obtain information and can:

* require any person to answer questions and produce relevant documents

* take sworn evidence

* enter agency premises

The IGIS' inquiries are conducted in private, but many of them are reported in annual reports.
_________________________________________________________

DIGO - Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation
http://www.defence.gov.au/DIGO/

NOTES: DIGO is the lead geospatial and imagery intelligence organisation in the Department of Defence.

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACT 2001 - SECT 6B
Functions of DIGO

The functions of DIGO are:

(a) to obtain geospatial and imagery intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia from the electromagnetic spectrum or other sources, for the purposes of meeting the requirements of the Government for such intelligence; and
(b) to obtain geospatial and imagery intelligence from the electromagnetic spectrum or other sources for the purposes of meeting the operational, targeting, training and exercise requirements of the Defence Force; and
(c) to obtain geospatial and imagery intelligence from the electromagnetic spectrum or other sources for the purposes of supporting Commonwealth authorities and State authorities in carrying out national security functions; and
(d) to communicate, in accordance with the Government's requirements, intelligence referred to in paragraph(a), (b) or (c); and
(e) to provide to Commonwealth authorities, State authorities and bodies approved in writing by the Minister, the following:
(i) imagery and other geospatial products, not being intelligence obtained under paragraph(a), (b) or (c);
(ii) assistance in relation to the production and use of such imagery or products;
(iii) assistance in relation to the performance by those authorities or bodies of emergency response functions.
_________________________________________________________

ONA - Office of National Assessments
http://www.ona.gov.au/

NOTES: The Office of National Assessments (ONA) is an intelligence agency in that it is responsible for assessment of intelligence - from all sources available to the government. Around 145 staff, ONA reports directly to the Prime Minister. ONA provides all-source assessments on international political, strategic and economic developments to the Prime Minister, senior ministers in the National Security Committee of Cabinet, and senior officials of government departments. ONA operates under its own legislation. ONA also has responsibility for coordinating and evaluating Australia's foreign intelligence activities. The Director-General of ONA is an independent statutory officer who is not subject to external direction on the content of ONA assessments.

ONA was established by the Office of National Assessments (ONA) Act 1977 as an independent body directly accountable to the Prime Minister. ONA provides all-source assessments on international political, strategic and economic developments to the Prime Minister and senior ministers in the National Security Committee of Cabinet. The Director-General of ONA is an independent statutory officer who is not subject to external direction on the content of ONA assessments.

ONA bases its assessments on information available to the Australian Government from all sources, both inside and outside the Government. It draws on information provided by other intelligence agencies, as well as diplomatic reporting, information and reporting from other government agencies, and material available from open sources such as news media and publications. ONA also consults broadly within government and with experts in other sectors.

In April 2005, the Open Source Branch (OSB) was incorporated into ONA. The role of the Open Source Branch is to collect and validate open sources and produce value-added open-source intelligence reports for ONA and other Australian and allied government agencies.

In addition to setting out ONA's assessment function, the ONA Act charges ONA with responsibility for co-ordinating Australia's foreign intelligence activities and issues of common interest among Australia's foreign intelligence agencies. ONA is also responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of Australia's foreign intelligence effort and the adequacy of its resourcing.

You may like to download the Australian Intelligence Community brochure which provides more information on ONA, our role and oversight of our activities.
_________________________________________________________

Frequently Asked Questions - FAQs
_________________________________________________________

Is ONA an Intelligence Agency?
Yes, ONA is an intelligence agency in that it is responsible for assessment of intelligence - from all sources available to the government. As is the case with most other countries, the Australian Government protects its national security in various ways, including through the collection and assessment of intelligence on other countries and on international developments. Some of the means used for acquiring this intelligence are secret and, because of this, assessments drawing on this intelligence need to be handled in a confidential manner. ONA does not itself covertly collect information on the Australian Government's behalf. ONA staff are employed for the most part under the Public Service Act as ongoing (permanent) or non-ongoing (contract) employees, or on secondment from other government agencies. Their engagement and identity are not secret.

Who works as an analyst in ONA?
ONA's analysts come from a range of backgrounds and are specialists in their field which could be of a particular country or region or of thematic issues such as transnational or strategic issues. The employment backgrounds of ONA staff include other parts of the Australian Public Service, academic institutions, the Australian Defence Force and the private sector. All jobs in the Office are open equally to men and women.

What qualifications do you need to work as an analyst in ONA?
ONA analysts are expected to have tertiary qualifications and many hold higher degrees. While ONA recruits a small number of junior analysts, linguists and research officers each year, for analysts the more usual pattern is to have work experience that will be useful to the Office. For instance, an economic analyst might previously have worked in a government department or the private sector. An applicant for a vacancy as a political/strategic analyst might have gained experience of a particular geographic region as the result of studying that region or through having worked there.

While an economics degree is the usual prerequisite for an economic analyst, the academic backgrounds of political/strategic analysts are diverse, with graduates holding humanities, social sciences or perhaps pure science degrees, with a wide range of majors.

What do ONA analysts do?
Broadly, ONA analysts use information from all sources - including the full spectrum of public sources and government material - to assess the significance of international developments for the Australian Government. They analyse issues and developments and prepare assessments for Prime Minister and senior ministers. All ONA reports are issued under the authority of its Director-General, who has statutory independence. ONA does not make recommendations on policy, but its reports are relevant to policy and part of the policy process.

What do you gain from working for ONA?
Working in ONA provides an opportunity to prepare material that goes direct to the Prime Minister and senior ministers. On international crises or other major overseas developments of concern to Australia, ONA is one of the principal organisations reporting to the Prime Minister. This is done in close conjunction with organisations such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence.

Overseas travel is a regular feature of analysts' duties, to broaden their knowledge of the issues for which they are responsible within the Office. In terms of career development, many ONA analysts move to Commonwealth agencies such as the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence after a period of employment with ONA.

Can ONA analysts discuss their work outside the office?
ONA analysts consult widely with others who have specialist knowledge both within and outside the Australian government so as to be well-informed. However, ONA staff may discuss classified material only with appropriately cleared people who have a need to know.

ONA's work is usually circulated to others in the government with appropriate clearances, but is not available for distribution outside these areas. So analysts have to accept that they cannot publish on areas for which they have responsibility within ONA.

_________________________________________________________

USEFUL RESEARCH LINKS
http://www.dsd.gov.au/library/index.html

_________________________________________________________

JSCIS - Joint Select Committee on the Intelligence Services
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/index.htm

_________________________________________________________

Australian Defence Department
http://www.defence.gov.au/index.htm

_________________________________________________________

Minister for Defence
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/index.cfm

_________________________________________________________

Prime Minister's Office
http://pm.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

Australian Navy
http://www.navy.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

Australian Army
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/

_________________________________________________________

RAFF Royal Australian Air Force
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/

_________________________________________________________

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
http://www.pmc.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

National Archives of Australia
http://www.naa.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

FedInfo - Government Information
http://www.fedinfo.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

Government On-Line Directory
http://www.gold.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
http://www.dfat.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

The Australian Commonwealth Government Entry Point
http://www.australia.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

Minister for Foreign Affairs
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/

_________________________________________________________

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/index.htm

NOTES: On Friday 2 December 2005 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD became the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Further predecessors to this committee include:

* Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation; and
* Joint Select Committee on the Intelligence Services.
_________________________________________________________

Australia National Security Hotline
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurityhome.nsf/Page/Hotline

NOTES: This web site provides a single access point for counter-terrorism information from the Australian Government.

The Australian approach to fighting terrorism is based on strong cooperative, coordinated and consultative relationships between the State and Territory governments, the Australian Government, and their departments and agencies.

This site also provides comprehensive information on the roles of Australia's counter-terrorism agencies, the coordination arrangements and the country's national counter-terrorism plan.

_________________________________________________________

Eye Spy Intelligence Magazine. All Rights Reserved 2008