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The following information is based on "Patterns of Global Terrorism" - US State Dept. This organization is the largest ultra-leftist radical group in Japan. They have a political arm as well as a small military wing called Kansai Revolutionary Army. The group originated from the fragmentation of the Japanese Communist Party in 1957. Their aim is to protest against Japan’s imperial system, Western imperialism and events such as the Gulf War and the expansion of Tokyo’s Narita airport. They have also attacked a US military base. They have about 3,500 members in Japan. They finance their activities with membership dues, sales of newspapers and fundraising campaigns. The organization's members participate in mass protest demonstrations and snake-dancing in streets. In the past year they supported farmers' protest of construction of Narita airport, among other causes. The majority of their activities have targeted property rather than people. They sabotaged part of Japanese railroad system in 1985 and 1986. They've carried out sporadic attacks designed to cause property damage through use of crude rockets and incendiary devices. Several attack targeted American facilities, including small-scale rocket attempts against US military and diplomatic targets; no US casualties so far. The organization has not recently engaged in terrorist activity. They operate only in Japan. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
aka.
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) The DFLP is a Marxist-Leninist and formerly pro-Soviet group that split from the Popular Font for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP) in 1969. It believes that Palestinian goals can only be achieved by a popular revolution of the working class; elite members of the movement should not be separated from the masses and the lower classes should be educated in true socialism to carry on the battle. At the spring 1977 Palestine National Council meeting, the DFLP gave full support to the Palestine national program, seeking the creation of a Palestinian state in any territory liberated from Israel. The DFLP was formed in 1969 with an estimated membership of 500. Its headquarters were initially in Syria, but their present whereabouts are unknown. The DFLP receives financial and military aid from Syria and Libya, and operates in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the occupied territories. Its leader is Naif Hawatmeh, who is assisted to a great extent by Yasser Abed Rabbu, Qais Samarral (Abu Leila), and Abd-al-Karim Hammad (Abu Adnan). In mid-1979, the DFLP reportedly experienced an upsurge in its membership and an corresponding increase in influence. Although it remained a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the DFLP cooperated increasingly with anti-Arafat Palestinian extremists. The DFLP strongly disapproved of the PLO Leadership's failure to take more severe action against Anwar Sadat after his peace initiative. Furthermore, the DFLP signed the Tripoli declaration in 1983, rejecting the Reagan and Fez peace plans and contact with the Israelis. In addition, the DFLP did not support the Fatah rebels in 1983 or 1984, believing that their movement was damaging to the Palestine cause. The organization also opposed the agreement between Yasir Arafat and King Hussein that called for a joint PLO-Jordanian position for peace negotiations with Israel. The DFLP refused to join the Syrian created Palestine National Salvation Front, but the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) did, leading to the breakup of the Democratic Alliance between the DFLP and PFLP. In early 1980s the organization occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the rejectionists. It split into two factions in 1991, one pro-Arafat and another more hard-line faction headed by Nayif Hawatmeh (which has suspended participation in the PLO). Prior to the rift following the March 1987 Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers, Syria had provided most of the DFLP's outside support, in addition to the training received by the organization in the Soviet Union and Cuba. The DFLP is also in contact with members of the Nicaraguan Sandinista Liberation Front. The organization opposes the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed in 1993. DFLP operations have always taken place either inside Israel or the West Bank and Gaza. Typical acts include minor bombings and grenade attacks, as well as spectacular operations to seize hostages and attempts to negotiate the return of Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners. In the 1970s, the organization carried out numerous small bombings and minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in Israel and the occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli targets. Since 1988, the organization has only been involved in border raids, but continues to oppose the Israel-PLO peace agreement. The DFLP's political and ideological objectives are:
Selected Incident Chronology:
May 1974
November 1974
July 1977
January 1979
March 1979
March 1982
February 1984
September 1985
March 1986 May 1988
Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah A Palestinian organization better known as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) headed by Sabri al-Bana (Abu Nidal) and founded in 1974 as a consequence of Abu Nidal`s split from the Fatah organization. The breakup and the foundation of the new organization was the result of the Iraqi regime's influence, which prompted Abu Nidal to launch independent terrorist operations to serve Iraqi interests. The organization considers itself since its foundation as the real Fatah, accusing the leaders of the original organization of treason. Fatah-RC was considered the most dangerous, active and murderous Palestinian terror organization in the 1980s. It has demonstrated an ability to operate over wide areas in the Middle East, Asia, South America and Europe. It has carried out operations and terrorist acts against targets of various Arab countries, more than any other Palestinian organization, and also against Palestinian militants considered to be too moderate. From the beginning of the 1980s FatahRC attacked also Jewish, Israeli and Western targets. It practically ceased all terrorist attacks in the 1990s, although it is still considered to be potentially dangerous due to its new relations with Iran. The FatahRC was also known as the Arab Revolutionary Council but choose to claim credit for its actions under the names of the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims when claiming credit for attacks on British targets, Black June when claiming credit for attacks on Jordanian targets, the Black September Organization. Fatah - RC has about 400 members plus dozens of militia men in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. It has no known affiliation in the Territories. During 1974-1980, the organization's headquarters were in Baghdad and its activity was mainly directed by the Iraqis, who gave Abu Nidal substantial logistic assistance. This period was characterized by terrorist attacks mainly against Syrian and Fatah/PLO targets. At the beginning of the 1980s, after disagreements between the Iraqis and Abu Nidal over the independence of his organization and Iraq's interest during the war with Iran to improve its relations with the West, Abu Nidal and his men were expelled from Iraq and moved to Syria. Later on the headquarters moved to Libya, and since 1985 are located there. Since 1981 FatahRC attacked Jewish, Israeli and Western targets, but also Jordanian and Gulf states objectives and continued to hit Fatah militants and leaders. US pressure on Syria constrained the organization to move its training and operational bases to Lebanon, in the Sidon area. The year 1987 marked a significant change in FatahRC's clandestine and secretive nature. The organization opened its ranks to new and young militants, formed a kind of militia and even initiated social and political activity in the Palestinian refugee camps in South Lebanon. The second half of the 1980s saw the most murderous and indiscriminate terror attacks by Fatah-RC. However, the new modus operandi and the exposure to the refugees in South Lebanon brought a serious split in the organization and the dissidence in November 1989 of two leaders, Atef Abu Baker, member of the Central Committee, and Abdel Rahman Issa, member of the Political Bureau. They accused Abu Nidal of murdering 150 militants because of his fear from internal subversion. A brief attempt to reconcile with Fatah and its leader Yasser Arafat also failed and left Abu Nidal more isolated than ever. The failure of the last operations in the 1980s (the attack on the ship City of Poros in Greece and the arrest of most of its militants in South America) marked the operational decline of the organization. It seems that since 1990 the organization has ceased to be active in the terrorist field, although it strengthened its relations with revolutionary Iran and participated in most of the congresses sponsored by Tehran. Abu Nidal's poor health may have played also its part in the weakening of Fatah-RC. The organization has several offices in Syria, Yemen, Iran, Sudan and Lebanon. It is considered one of the most economically viable of all terrorist organizations. It is estimated that beside its income from patron states, it has revenues from extortion and from its own network of businesses and front organizations.
The organization claims that the armed
struggle against Israel is a sacred principle, the only way to achieve the
liberation of all of Palestine, and nobody can deny it from the Palestinian
people. Fatah and its leaders have betrayed this principle and the
Palestinian Covenant so they must be punished. Both inter-Arab and
intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed in order to precipitate an
all-embracing Arab revolution that can alone lead to the liberation of
Palestine. The organization is fully identified with its leader Abu Nidal, and only few activists are known besides him. Sabri al-Bana (Abu Nidal) was born in 1939 in Jaffa. He emigrated with his family to Saudi Arabia after the Six Day War and worked there as a teacher. He joined Fatah in Egypt and in 1969 became its representative in Khartoum, Sudan. In 1970 Abu Nidal was appointed Fatah's representative in Baghdad, Iraq. There he began consolidating around him a group of loyal activists. With the assistance of the Iraqi intelligence services, Abu Nidal formed his own terrorist group and began to act in against Fatah's official policy, because of his opposition to any participation in the political negotiations.
On 26 October 1973 Abu Nidal was sentenced by Fatah, in absentia, to death, officially for "embezzlement and misuse of authority", but in reality for an attempt on Arafat's life. In the last years there are only rumors about his location, his health and whether he is alive or dead.
September 5, 1973: While still in the framework of Fatah, Abu Nidal occupied the Saudi embassy in Paris, asking the release of Abu Dawud, a Fatah terrorist imprisoned in Jordan during the September 1970 events. September 26, 1976: Attack and take-over of the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus, Syria. Two of the participating terrorists were hanged in public. October 11, 1976: Attacks on Syrian embassies in Islamabad, Pakistan and Rome, Italy . November 17, 1976: Attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, Jordan . December 13, 1976: Failed assassination attempt against Khadam, the Syrian foreign minister in Damascus, Syria and failed attack on the Syrian embassy In Istanbul, Turkey. October 25, 1977: Another failed attempt to assassinate Khadam, the Syrian foreign minister, this time in Abu Dhabi. The United Arab Emirates minister of state for foreign affairs is killed during this attack. January 4, 1978: Assassination of Said Hammami, the PLO representative in London, UK. February 18, 1978: The senior Egyptian journalist Youssef al-Seba'i, President of the Conference of the Organization for the Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America is killed during an attack on the conference hall. June 15, 1978: Assassination of Ali Yassin, the PLO representative in Kuwait. August 3, 1978: Assassination of Izz al-Din al-Kalak, the PLO representative in Paris, France, and of one of his assistants. August 5, 1978: Attack on the PLO offices in Islamabad, Pakistan. January, 17, 1980: Assassination of Yussouf Mubarak, director of the Palestinian library-shop in Paris, France. July 27, 1980: Attack on the children of a Jewish school in Antwerpen, Belgium. Claimed responsibility for the murder of the Israeli commercial attache in Brussels. May 1, 1981: Assassination of Heinz Nittel, President of the Austrian-Israeli Friendship Association in Vienna, Austria. June 1, 1981: Assassination of Naim Khader, the PLO representative in Brussels, Belgium. August 29, 1981: Machiattack on Vienna synagogue, kills two and wounds 17 persons. June 3, 1982: Attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom. The attack will trigger the war Israel waged in Lebanon against the PLO presence. August 9, 1982: Machine-gun attack on the Jewish restaurant Goldberg in Paris, France. August 26, 1982: Attempted assassination of the United Arab Emirates's consul in Bombay, India, and attempted assassination of another Kuwaiti diplomat in Karachi, Pakistan. September 16, 1982: Assassination of a Kuwaiti diplomat in Madrid, Spain. September 19, 1982: Attack on a synagogue in Brussels, Belgium. October 9, 1982: One child is killed and another ten people are injured in a grenade and machine-gun attack on the central synagogue in Rome, Italy. April 10, 1983: Assassination of PLO official Issam Sartawi at the Socialist International conference in Lisbon, Portugal. Attempted assassination of the Jordanian ambassador to Italy, in Rome. October 25, 1983: Assassination of the Jordanian ambassador in New Delhi, India. The next day, the Jordanian ambassador in Rome, Italy, is also killed. November 7, 1983: Assassination of a security guard during an attack on the Jordanian embassy in Athens, Greece. December 1983: Believed responsible for bombing the French Cultural Center in Izmir, Turkey. December 29, 1983: Assassination of the Jordanian ambassador in Madrid, Spain. February 8, 1984: Assassination of the UAE ambassador in Paris, France. March 1984: Assassination of a British diplomat in Athens, Greece. March, 24, 1984: A bomb is discovered in the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, during the visit of Queen Elisabeth II in Jordan. June 5, 1984: Attempted assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Cairo, Egypt. October, 27, 1984: Attempted assassination of an UAE's diplomat in Rome, Italy. November 27, 1984: Assassination of the British High Commissioner in Bombay, India. November 29, 1984: Bombing of the British Airways offices in Beirut, Lebanon. Attempted assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Athens, Greece. December 4, 1984: Assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Bucarest, Rumania (Black September). December 26, 1984: Bombing of PLO leader Hani al-Hassan's home in Amman, Jordan (Black September). December 29, 1984: Assassination of PLO activist Fahed Kawasmeh in Amman, Jordan (Black September). March 21, 1985: Bombings of ALIA (the Royal Jordanian Airlines) offices in Rome, Athens and Nicosia (Black September). April 3, 4, 1985: Rockets fired at an ALIA airliner as it took off from Athens airport (although the rocket did not detonate, it left a hole in the fuselage) and against the Jordanian embassy in Rome. July 22, 1985: Failed bombing of the American embassy in Cairo. July , 1985: Bombing of the British Airways office in Madrid (one person killed and twenty seven wounded); five minutes later attack on ALIA offices, two blocks away (two persons wounded). Grenade attack against the Cafe de Paris in Rome (thirty eight people wounded). November 23, 1985: Hijacking of an Egyptian plane to Malta, where sixty-six people were killed during a rescue attempt by the Egyptian military forces. December 27, 1985: Major attacks on Rome and Vienna airports, killing sixteen and wounding scores. Attempted hijack of a Pan-Am flight at Karachi airport (22 persons killed). September 6, 1986: Attack on the Neve-Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, killing twenty-two worshippers. November 1987: Hijacking of a yacht with its eight Belgian occupants, taken hostage to Libya. March 1988: A lone gunman attacks an Alitalia airlines crew aboard a commuter bus in Bombay, seriously wounding the crew captain. May 1988: Simultaneous attacks on the Acropole Hotel and the Sudan Club in Khartoum (eight persons killed and twenty-one wounded.). July 1988: Following the premature detonation of a car bomb at an Athens pier, in which two terrorists were killed, gunmen aboard the excursion ship City of Poros attacked the passengers, killing nine and wounding ninety-eight. January 14, 1991: PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad, the most senior official of Fatah after Yasser Arafat, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah, assassinated by an Abu Nidal terrorist in Tunis. The Tanzim is the armed wing of the Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The Tanzim acts as paramilitary counter-balance to the military wings of the Palestinian opposition groups, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The organization also serves as an informal, unofficial “Palestinian army” which can engage Israeli security forces and Jewish civilians without officially breaking signed agreements with Israel. Tanzim militants have played a significant military role in demonstrations and clashes with Israeli security forces. The organization has been at the forefront of the violent demonstrations which erupted in October 2000, when peace talks with Israel over a final settlement reached a dead end. Its members were also prominent in two previous cycles of violence: the Nakba riots of May 2000, and the “Tunnel Riots” of September 1996. The 1996 riots broke out after the Israeli government opened an archeological site in the Old City of Jerusalem to tourism. Tanzim members participated for the first time alongside Palestinian policemen in clashed with Israeli security forces. In the Nakba riots, Tanzim members again played an armed role, shooting at IDF outposts and border crossings. The Tanzim have played a leading role in the activities of the "al-Aqsa Intifada," including carrying out ambushes of civilian vehicles and bombings of buses in Israeli cities. The Tanzim was set up in 1995 by Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and the Fatah leadership, as a quasi-military force to offset the growing power of the Palestinian Islamist groups. At least part of Fatah's motivation to establish such a group came from incidents of armed confrontation with the opposition groups. In November of 1994, for example, a showdown between PA security forces and Hamas in Gaza resulted in the death of 13 civilians. Since its founding, the popularity and influence of the Tanzim on the Palestinian political scene has steadily grown. The organization is seen as a popular, grass-roots movement, separate from, but subordinate to, the Palestinian Authority. It serves as a counterweight to the Islamists, channeling and focusing the passions of the Palestinian street on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. It can thus contest the power of the Islamist groups for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian populace. However, the Tanzim acts as a counterweight not only to the military might of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, but also to that of the Palestinian security forces. In contrast to the PA security forces, which is the domain of PLO officials who returned from exile in Arab countries, the Tanzim is the stronghold of the “insiders.” While, the “outsiders" are seen as corrupt, interested more in personnel wealth than in the Palestinian cause, the “insiders” represent the common Palestinian in the street. The Tanzim is very much a popular, grassroots organization, whose power is based on its leadership at a community--rather than a national--level. The vast majority of its leaders are “graduates of the Intifada,” many of whom spent time in Israeli prisons for their activities. Marwan Barghouti, who heads the Tanzim in the West Bank made his reputation during the Intifada, finally getting expelled by the Israelis for his activities. The Tanzim thus serves a dual function within the Palestinian power structure. On the one hand, it is essentially loyal to Arafat, and providing Arafat with a tool for violent confrontation without risking international condemnation for violating signed agreements. The organization also serves Arafat as an unofficial Fatah militia to rival the armed wings of the Islamist groups--a kind of “armed statement of intent” should the Islamists seek to usurp Arafat’s leadership. The Tanzim is thus one of several tools in Arafat’s “divide and conquer” strategy against various rival Palestinian power groups. In particular, this can be seen in the attempts to establish a security mechanism to compete with Jibril Rajoub’s Preventive Security apparatus. On the other hand, The Tanzim also acts as a safety valve for popular grievances against the corrupt, nepotistic and, sometimes, brutal elites that Arafat has encouraged to sprout around his leadership. As part of Fatah, the Tanzim adheres to the Palestinian nationalist ideology of the larger movement, holding its founder Arafat in great esteem and believing him to embody the Palestinian struggle. However, the Tanzim is very much a grass-roots organization, setting the insider leadership of the Intifada generation against what many Palestinians see as the corrupt leadership of the “exiles,” who returned with Arafat in 1994. The Tanzim members see themselves as being in the vanguard of the future Palestinian state. One of the lessons born of Fatah’s long experience with the governments of the Arab world is the need for self-sufficiency. The other Arabs were seen as untrustworthy with regard to any real contribution to the Palestinian cause. This ideology of self-sufficiency has been vigorously inculcated in the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza. One of Fatah’s goals is the indoctrination, through the activities of the Tanzim, of young people into nationalistic frameworks. The organization works to motivate them to take an active role in nationalistic and political activities of the Fatah organization, as well as in demonstrations and military operations. As part of this indoctrination to self-sufficiency, the organization operates summer camps, which include weaponry instruction and military training, as well as regular self-defense, first aid and civil defense courses. The organization’s leadership claims to have provided military training to thousands of youth people. Ideologically, the Tanzim can be seen as the heir to the Fatah Hawks--Arafat’s armed enforcers during the later days of the Intifada--which was dismantled through a security agreement with Israel in 1995-1996. The Tanzim maintains a no-compromise position on the peace process, in contrast to the, at least outwardly, more moderate Palestinian Authority position. Barghouti and the Tanzim have also been among the leading proponents of a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. Thus, the organization deflects popular criticism of what many Palestinians see as Arafat’s willingness to make concessions to Israel. By taking part in demonstrations and protests against the Israelis, the organization acts as a popular counterweight to the Islamists, who have always maintained that there can be no peace as long as Israel exists. The Tanzim organizational structure is divided into geographical sectors and subdivided into cells. The Tanzim has branches in every neighborhood, village, refugee camp and high school. In Ramallah, for example, the Tanzim has ten neighborhood branches, as well as its main headquarters. The organization’s strongest branches operate within the universities--Bir Zeit, Bethlehem and An-Najar, in Nablus. The organization is actively involved in all central Fatah functions within the Palestinian population, including political and educational activities. In addition, the Tanzim conducts military training for Palestinian young people of all ages, under the leadership of officers of the Palestinian security apparatus. Most of the Tanzim membership is made up of adult Palestinian men, aged 20-35. The Tanzim claims to have tens of thousands of members, most of them residents of the Palestinian autonomous territories, and the vast majority “graduates of the intifada.” According to local sources, virtually every Fatah member ever imprisoned in Israel belongs to the Tanzim. However, the organization’s greatest strength is in the Universities, and the majority of Tanzim members are either university students or recent graduates. A number of the Tanzim’s leading members also serve in the Palestinian security services--many of them in the framework of Jibril Rajoub's security apparatus, where they serve as field commanders. Financial and military resources It is unclear how much individual fighters are paid, and how the organization’s budget is divided up. At the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, in October, the Palestinian Authority was offering large sums to people--particularly children--willing to risk injury or death to participate in attacks on Israeli positions. Their families were offered $300 per injury and $2,000 for anyone killed. This money is believed to have come from Tanzim allocations. The Tanzim is in possession of a considerable arsenal of weaponry--from pistols and assault rifles to machine guns and anti-tank missiles. Some of these weapons have been given to the Tanzim by the Palestinian Authority, while others have been purchased from various sources, including from the Israeli underworld. Israel intelligence sources say that the organization has been stockpiling expensive hi-tech German MP-5 submachine guns smuggled in to the Autonomy from Jordan and Egypt. Arafat is personally involved in the selection of senior leaders in the organization. However, the individual members of the Tanzim receive their orders from the local commanders, rather than from Arafat or Palestinian Authority officials. Although Arafat maintains ongoing links with the Tanzim commanders, finances the organization and uses its members as a militia in confrontations with Israel, he can maintain that the activities of the organization are beyond his control. Leaders of the Tanzim are mostly “Intifada graduates,” many of whom spent years in Israeli prisons. These “insiders” are frequently at odds with the traditional leadership of the Fatah, comprised mostly of “outsiders,” who arrived from abroad following the Oslo Agreement, and who today represent the majority among the leaders of the various mechanisms and the senior positions in the PA. The insiders are of a generation largely excluded by the Fatah leadership from the top level of Fatah administration. As such, the Tanzim represents a far more popular, representational leadership than does the Fatah Revolutionary Council itself. Of the top Tanzim leaders, only one--Marwan Barghouti--also serves on the Revolutionary Council. Barghouti is the secretary general of Fatah in the West Bank and the acknowledged head of the Tanzim. Born in 1959 to one of the leading families of Ramallah, Barghouti served as student council president at Bir Zeit University for four years. As a student leader he was one of the organizers of the Intifada in 1987. He was arrested and spent two years in an Israeli prison, and was then expelled from the West Bank by Israel. In exile he served at the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, close to Chairman Arafat, and in 1989 he was elected to the Fatah Revolutionary Council, becoming its youngest member. Barghouti returned to the West Bank after the Oslo agreement in 1994. In the first election for the Palestinian Legislative Council, in 1996, he was elected as a representative of the Ramallah region and was involved in the foundation of the Tanzim paramilitary forces. Barghouti is seen as a leader of the people, for the people. He has been extremely critical of the corruption in the PA executive authority. In June 1998, for example, Barghouti publicly criticized Arafat’s decision to re-appoint six ministers to his cabinet after they were named by a Palestinian Legislative Council report on corruption. He has also been critical of the abuses of power in the PA security apparatus. In a 1998 power-play, units of the PA Military Intelligence raided the Tanzim offices in Ramallah. In the ensuing demonstration protesting the break-in, Military Intelligence forces shot at Fatah and Tanzim members, killing one boy, Wissam Tarifi. The Tanzim responded by demanding the resignation of Military Intelligence head Musa Arafat, a nephew of Yasser Arafat. Barghouti’s criticism of the security apparatus was seen by many as veiled criticism of Arafat. Barghouti’s rising star has been watched by Arafat’s circles with some trepidation, and Arafat has made some attempts to “take him down a peg” by encouraging rivalries. However, Barghouti’s popularity is high, particularly with the popular constituency of the Tanzim, and as long as he professes loyalty to Arafat, his value to Arafat still continues to outweigh any potential threat to his authority. But all has not been clear sailing for Barghouti. In the last election for the position for General Secretary of Fatah in the West Bank, Barghouti lost to his opponent, Hussein Al-Sheikh. Yasser Arafat canceled the results of the elections. Hussein Al-Sheikh, also a resident of Ramallah, is a political opponent of Barghouti and competes with him for the leadership of the Tanzim in the West Bank. Al-Sheikh is supported by Hachem Balawy, who was appointed by Arafat to reduce the power of Barghouti. In the Gaza Strip, the Tanzim is led by Ahmad Chiles, who was a minor activist in the organization until he was recently appointed Fatah secretary in Gaza. Chiles is a seasoned veteran from the Intifada period, who has a history of extreme views and incitement to violence. His brother, a senior officer in the Palestinian security forces, controls the Fatah apparatus in the Gaza Strip. He is reportedly close to Palestinian security chief, Mohammed Dachlan and works in close coordination with him. The Tanzim are active in initiating and organizing demonstrations and confrontations against Israel, and in “showcase” demonstrations orchestrated for the benefit of the media. Many of these actions are carried out according to a well-planned and executed routine. Large numbers of civilians--including children whose schools were closed to allow their participation--are brought to IDF positions in chartered buses. The civilian demonstrators advance on the IDF positions in mass, hurling stones and petrol bombs. Meanwhile, armed Tanzim members take up positions within the crowd and begin firing on the army personnel. The soldiers are often forced to return fire at the attackers, who are well hidden behind their voluntary “human shields.” The Fatah leadership maintains that the international support for the Palestinian cause gained in this way far outweighs the loss of life incurred. In addition to orchestrating the more “photogenic” popular activities, Tanzim members have also been at the forefront of the tactical shooting attacks against IDF guard posts and border crossings, as well as bombings of IDF positions and patrols. This guerilla activity is augmented by terrorist attacks--actions directed specifically against civilians. Tanzim members have been involved in the majority of shooting attacks against Israeli vehicles in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as in several bombings of civilian buses within Israeli cities. More recently, Tanzim members have participated in “cocktail” cells, together with members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These mixed cells have been involved in a variety of terrorist actions against Israeli civilians, including road ambushes and bombings. Many Tanzim members also operate in the framework of various Palestinian security apparatuses. The Tanzim thus provides Arafat with a very useful tool in the confrontation with Israel—a deniable para-military force, which can attack Israel without the risk of a political backlash. The nebulous links between the Tanzim and the Arafat’s Palestinian Authority, have led some observers to the erroneous conclusion that Arafat has only limited control over the organization, if indeed he controls it at all. By fostering such a misconception, Arafat can maintain a policy of “talking and shooting” at the same time, while blaming “uncontrolled elements on both sides” for the ongoing violence. Force 17 was formed in the early 1970’s by senior Al-Fatah officers, shortly after the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan. There are a variety of different explanations of how the unit got its name. One version claims that the numbers 1,7 were the last digits of the private phone number of the unit’s first commander. According to another version, the name derives from the location of the unit’s office in Beirut: 17 Faqahani street. Force 17 has been involved in terrorism since the early 1980’s, and has carried out attacks against both Israeli and rival Palestinian targets in the Middle East and Europe. As a result of the Oslo Agreements between Israel and the PLO, Force 17 was to have been merged into the PA security forces. In reality, Arafat kept the unit apart from the official Palestinian forces, and today it acts under his authority alone. Originally intended as a personal security force for Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, Force 17 eventually became one of the PLO’s elite units and functioned in various areas of operational activities under the direct guidance of Ararfat. Among the unit’s functions was gathering intelligence, and the perpetration of terror attacks against Israeli targets in the 1980’s. It also served Arafat as a combat unit during Israel’s “Peace for Galilee” operation in Lebanon. In August 1982, as a result of the Israeli attack on its headquarters, Force 17 along with the other PLO forces, left Lebanon for Tunisia. There, the unit set up shop near the central PLO headquarters. Force 17 and the Oslo agreements As a part of the Oslo Agreements, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) agreed to establish the General Security Service (GSS), officially known as the Palestinian Directorate of Police Force. The GSS is an umbrella organization nominally responsible for coordinating and maintaining most of the Palestinian Security bodies and services; it includes not only police but also intelligence organizations. The 1994 Cairo Agreement’s determined that the GSS would be the highest and only security authority in the Palestinian Authority. Despite this, Arafat created two additional forces, outside the control of the GSS, and subject to the authority of the PA chairman alone. These forces are the Special Security Force (SSF) and Al-Amn Al-Ri’asah (Presidential security) unit. As part of the reorganization of the Palestinian security forces, Force 17 was merged with the Presidential Security unit, commanded by Faisal Abu Sharah. Presidential Security force is a high-quality security paramilitary unit, estimated at 3,000 members, a majority of whom were once members of Force 17. The unit is responsible for Arafat’s personal security and operates under his direction, although, as originally defined in Oslo II, the unit was to have been part of the GSS. The protection of the chairman, as well as other political personalities and important installations, is the main objective of al-Amn al-Ri’asah, but in addition it handles counter-terrorism and is responsible for arresting opposition activists and suspects of collaboration with Israel. Two subsidiary bodies of al-Amn al-Ri’asah are the Intelligence Unit, whose main mission is information gathering about the activities of the opposition movements and other domestic threats, and the Presidential Guard, Arafat’s most loyal and trusted inner circle. This unit provides the tight security around him, with the aim of preventing any assassination attempts. Although officially, Force 17 disbanded when Arafat returned to Gaza, the background of most of the officers in al-Amn al-Ri’asah leads most Palestinians to refer to this branch simply as Force 17. The unit’s first commander, Ali Hassan Salame, served for only a short time. Salame was one of those who took a part in the massacre of the Israeli delegation to the Olympic games in Munich in 1972. On 22 January 1979, he died in the detonation of an explosive device placed under his car in Beirut, an act attributed by the PLO to Israeli intelligence. Two other senior officers of Force 17, Mahmoud Hamshari and Muhammed Budia were killed in Belgium and France, respectively, in similar circumstances. After Salame’s death, Colonel Mahmoud al Natour (Abu Tayeb), who had for many years been the personal bodyguard of Yasser Arafat, took command of Force 17. In 1984, with the thawing of relations between the PLO and Jordan, some of the senior officers of Force 17 resolved to form a new terrorist apparatus, which would initiate terror activities from Jordan using Palestinian cells in the West Bank. This apparatus was to operate alongside the “West Bank Sector” of the PLO, run by Abu Jihad, which also operated from Jordan. The involvement of Force 17 in terror operations in the West Bank was a source of rivalry and tension between Abu Tayeb and Abu Jihad. This rivalry was skillfully manipulated by Yasser Arafat to consolidate his own power. From April 1984 onwards, Force 17 expanded its activities to Europe. The first step was to build an extensive infrastructure of terrorist cells, weapon and ammunition depots and safe houses in various countries. This activity was brought to light in December 1984, when Romanian authorities found a huge cache of arms—including AK-47 rifled, pistols and hand grenades—at the house of Force 17 member Abu Salim, in Bucharest. On 25 September 1985, two Israelis were in the Marina of Larnaka in Cyprus. Two Palestinians and one British mercenary were arrested by the local authorities, and told interrogators that they were members of Force 17. On the morning of 22 July 1987, Palestinian caricaturist Nagy El-Ali was shot on the steps of the Kuwaiti newspaper El-Kabas in Chelsea in U.K. He later died of his wounds. El-Ali was known for his political cartoons against the Palestinian leadership and against Arafat. As El-Ali was a British citizen, the local authorities invested great efforts in solving the murder. The investigation eventually led to the arrest of members of Force 17. A search of an apartment belonging to one of the men, Ismail Sawan, discovered weapons, hand grenades, and 145 kg. of Semtex plastic explosives. In the late eighties another elite unit was formed by former members of Force 17: the “Hawari apparatus,” also known as the “Special Operations Apparatus.” The founder and leader of the new group was Colonel Abdallah Abd El Labib, who was also called Colonel Hawari. The mission of the Hawari group was to serve as a clandestine operational wing of the Fatah dealing with terrorist activities in Europe. It was mean to be totally deniable: the PLO repudiated all connection to the “Hawari Apparatus,” although it operated under Yasser Arafat’s direct command. The Apparatus was involved in several terror activities in Europe in the late eighties:
Force 17 and the El-Aqsa Intifada From the first days of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Force 17 had an active role in carrying out terrorist activities against Israel. While hiding behind the title of the Presidential Security, senior officers of the apparatus were involved in a number of terror operations:
On 13 February 2001, Masoud Ayad, a senior officer (Lt. Colonel) in Force 17 was killed by IDF helicopters in Gaza. IDF spokesman claimed that Ayad was involved in mortar attacks against IDF positions and Israeli settlements in Gaza strip, and was believed to have operated in cooperation with the Hizb’allah.[10]
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